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VIRTUAL WORLDS-REAL COURTS 
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS* 
FAST forward say twenty years from the present. The virtual worlds that developed in the late twentieth century have increased greatly in num-
ber and popularity. 1 This increase has been accompanied by two growing 
concerns. As more children have begun to play in virtual worlds, the old 
issues of exposure to sex and violence have again come to the fore. There 
have been calls for legislation attempting to screen those under seventeen 
from increasingly realistic depictions of both varieties. The effort has fol-
lowed the route of earlier attempts to control access to Internet pornogra-
phy2 and the playing of violent video games. 3 
In addition to governmental attempts at speech limitations based on 
the games' effects on children, there have also been limitations imposed 
by those who control the virtual worlds. The owners of the servers on 
which the worlds "exist" have insisted on the right to limit the in-world 
speech of those who inhabit those worlds. In response, the players have 
asserted a legal right to be free of censorship, not only by the United 
States and the various states, but also by the virtual world owners, and 
more and more of these cases have found their way into real world courts.4 
The second sort of problem, one unrelated to free expression, is a 
growth in litigation over issues arising in the virtual worlds.s In some vir-
tual worlds, there are court systems to resolve disputes surrounding events 
in that virtual world.6 In others there are no such institutions. Those em-
* Senior Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Michigan State University. 
A.B., Franklin & Marshall College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., 
University of Michigan. The author would like to thank the organizers of and 
participants in the "State of Play II" conference for the opportunity not only to 
receive reactions to a brief presentation of thoughts on regulation of virtual worlds 
but also to acquire from them an understanding of the phenomenon. The 
conference was organized by the Institute for Law and Policy of New York Law 
School and the Information Society Project of Yale Law School and was held at 
New York Law School, October 28-30, 2004. 
l. For a further discussion of virtual worlds, see infra notes 16-31 and accom-
panying text. For a further discussion of the likelihood of virtual worlds' growth, 
see infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
2. For a further discussion of earlier attempts to control access to Internet 
pornography, see infra notes 147-83 and accompanying text. 
3. For a further discussion of earlier attempts to control the playing of violent 
video games, see infra notes 184-211 and accompanying text. 
4. For a further discussion of the legal theories that may be asserted regarding 
virtual worlds, see infra notes 80-115 and accompanying text. 
5. For a further discussion of the potential for future litigation concerning 
virtual worlds, see infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. 
6. For a further discussion of the development of in-world dispute resolution, 
see infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
(187) 
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broiled in disputes in this latter sort of world, as well as those whose cause 
of action arose in one of the former but who wish to collect damages in a 
currency other than the like of simoieans,7 have increasingly taken to fil-
ing actions in federal and state courts. The courts have become suffi-
ciently bogged down and cases arising in the real world are significantly 
delayed. 
To remedy this problem, Congress enacted a jurisdictional statute af-
fecting the cases that may be heard in federal and state courts.8 The stat-
ute provides: 
The courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction in an ac-
tion if and only if the action arose in a world without courts of 
competent jurisdiction. 
The intent is that, if the dispute arose in a virtual world with courts, 
the case has to be resolved there; but if there are no courts in that world, 
jurisdiction is available in a real world court. In application, everything 
worked well for a while. Everyone had some court to which to appeal, and 
the burden on the real world courts was lessened. 
The difficulty arose when the defendant in a garden-variety contract 
action arising in the real world United States asserted that the U.S. courts 
had no jurisdiction to hear the case and asked for the action to be dis-
missed. The defendant reasoned that, since the case arose out of a trans-
action in the United States, that is, in a world with courts of competent 
jurisdiction, the statute says that the courts of the United States do not 
have jurisdiction. The plaintiff responded in kind, noting that if the 
courts of the Unites States do not have jurisdiction under that statute, 
then the case arose in a world without courts of competent jurisdiction, so 
the statute provides that the U.S. courts do have jurisdiction. In its reply 
brief, the defendant asserted that under the plaintiffs reasoning, the U.S. 
courts no longer have jurisdiction. 
The statute is a variety of Russell's paradox. Bertrand Russell and Al-
fred North Whitehead examined the set of all sets not containing them-
selves as an element and asked if that set should contain itself, with the 
same result as above.9 Other examples include the Dutch mayor paradox 
and the librarian's paradox. lO In the Dutch mayor paradox, the govern-
7. Simoleans is the currency used in The Sims Online. For a further discussion 
of the issue of trading virtual world assets in the real world, see infra notes 213-22 
and accompanying text. 
8. For the purposes of this article, we will assume that there are no federalism 
issues in Congress addressing the jurisdiction of the state courts in the way sug-
gested and no other constitutional problems regarding the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. 
9. See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD & BERTRAND RUSSELL, 1 PRINCIPIA 
MATHEMATICA 60 (2d ed. 1960) (examining set of all sets not containing them-
selves as element to determine whether that set should contain itself). 
10. The origin of these iterations of the Russell paradox is not clear, but they 
are well known to mathematics and philosophy students. A source for the catalog 
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ment of the Netherlands notes that some cities and towns have mayors 
who reside in the city or town, while in others, the mayor resides outside 
the city or town of which he or she is mayor. A law is passed setting up an 
enclave to be occupied by all those and only those who are mayors of cities 
or towns in which they do not reside. When the enclave becomes large 
enough to require a mayor, the question becomes whether that mayor is 
to reside in the enclave. 
The librarian's paradox arises in a locale in which libraries maintain 
their lists of books in catalog books. Some of the catalog books list them-
selves as an item. For example, a catalog of stamp collecting books has 
"catalog of stamp collecting books" as an entry. Other catalogs do not list 
themselves. The head librarian orders a master catalog of all and only 
those catalogs that do not list themselves as entries. Again, the question is 
whether the master catalog should list itself, and the result is the same. 
It is clear that the Dutch mayor rule, the librarian's edict and the 
hypothetical statute could be reworded to avoid the problem. Indeed, the 
solution to Russell-like paradoxes is to recognize differences in types or 
levels and just not talk about the sort of things leading to the problems. 1 I 
When it comes to rules, do not mix mayors of ordinary citizens with may-
ors of mayors, and do not mix catalogs of books and catalogs of catalogs. 
And perhaps the lesson to be learned from the hypothetical is to not mix 
jurisdiction in real world cases with jurisdiction over issues arising in vir-
tual worlds. 
That is at least the lesson I would draw from the difficulties that exist 
when rules of one type of entity lapse over into the consideration of other 
types, particularly in a hierarchical situation. Keep the issues arising in 
virtual worlds out of the courts of the real world, at least to the greatest 
degree possible. There will certainly be real world cases that involve 
events in virtual worlds, but the effect on which the case is based should be 
a real world effect and the remedy a real world remedy. 
This article will first explain virtual worlds and indicate how we could 
get to the situation that led to the regulation schemes and the hypotheti-
cal statute. I2 The effort will then turn to examining both sorts of issues. 
The attempts to limit access will be dealt with as the clear First Amend-
ment issues they are. I3 The claims by players to be free from the censor-
ship of the server owner also raise constitutional issues, including First 
paradox may be found in HASKELL B. CURRY, FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL 
LOGIC 5 (1963), attributing the "pseudoparadox" to F. GONSETH, LES MATHEMATI-
QUES ET LA REAUTE: ESSAI SUR LA METHODE AxIOMATIQUE 253 (1936). 
11. See WHITEHEAD & RUSSELL, supra note 9, at 63 (suggesting solution to Rus-
sell-like paradoxes). 
12. For a further discussion of virtual worlds and how we could get to the 
situation that led to the regulation schemes and the hypothetical statute, see infra 
notes 16-44 and accompanying text. 
13. For a further discussion of the attempts to limit access within their First 
Amendment context, see infra notes 45-79 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment issues, and will be addressed in the same section. 14 I will 
then examine a number of different varieties of potential litigation arising 
in virtual worlds. IS Some will be recognized as causes of action that 
should be heard in real world courts because of their real world effects. It 
will also be argued that for others the resolution of disputes should not 
take up real world courts' time. The examination is not intended to be 
exhaustive. Indeed, it would be difficult to predict all the varieties of legal 
disputes that might arise in the context of virtual worlds. The examina-
tion will provide examples of the sort of analysis suggested for the determi-
nation of whether certain legal actions should be heard in real world 
courts, and the analytic approach that may be applied to unforeseen fu-
ture legal issues. 
I. VIRTUAL WORLDS 
A. The Present 
Unnoticed by many, if not by most of those residing in this world, 
there has been a relatively sudden development of, and increase in, alter-
native worlds. While these other worlds do not have the physical concrete-
ness of the world with which we are all familiar, many find them more 
interesting and more appealing places to spend their time and effort. 
These worlds are known as virtual worlds, worlds that provide the playing 
boards for massive multi player online role playing games. 
While these games may trace their roots to the text-based multi-user 
dungeons first developed in 1979, the player interaction in a graphics-rich 
environment that characterizes current virtual worlds is more a product of 
the late 1990s. 16 In games such as Everquest, Dark Age of Camelot, Ultima 
Online, Second Life, Lineage 2 and The Sims Online, the player subscribes to 
an online service provided by the likes of Sony (Everquest) or Entertain-
ment Arts (The Sims Online). In exchange for the subscription price, the 
player receives access to a server that contains the virtual world. The 
player is personified in the virtual world by a character known as an avatar. 
That avatar interacts with the avatars of other players. They do so against 
the background provided by the owner of the server, sometimes referred 
to as the platform, which may range from fantasy worlds in which the laws 
14. For a further discussion of the relevant First Amendment issues, see infra 
notes 80-lI5 and accompanying text. 
15. For a further discussion of the potential litigation arising in virtual worlds, 
see infra notes 126-250 and accompanying text. 
16. See Beth Simone Noveck, Introduction: The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REv. 1, 6-13 (2004) (providing history of development of massive multiplayer on-
line role playing games). Noveck's article is an introduction to a symposium grow-
ing out of the State of Play Conference on Law and Virtual Worlds in the Fall of 
2003. A second and a third conference followed in the Falls of 2004 and 2005. 
The symposium issue is a good source for the history of and legal issues arising 
from virtual worlds. 
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of physics need not apply!7 to a world that more closely mirrors the real 
world. 18 
As the description indicates, virtual worlds are more than just video 
games. There is a multi player aspect that can also be present in mul-
tiplayer video games, but it is combined with more player-to-player com-
munication. It is also more than an Internet chat room because there are 
play and graphics aspects not present in chat rooms. Professor Edward 
Castronova offers a definition of virtual worlds: 
A virtual world . .. is a computer program with three defining 
features: 
(1) Interactivity: it exists in one computer but can be accessed 
remotely (i.e. by an internet connection) and simultaneously by a 
large number of people, with the command inputs of one person 
affecting the command results of other people. 
(2) Physicality: people access the program through an interface 
that simulates a first-person physical environment on their com-
puter screen .... 
(3) Persistence: the program continues to run whether anyone is 
using it or not; it remembers the location of people and things, 
as well as the ownership of objects. 19 
This third aspect is important and goes beyond what the language 
may indicate. Even a simple video game may continue to run if the pro-
gram is not stopped, and can store data on the status of the game during 
interruption in play. In a virtual world, however, the game goes on, and 
the world changes as a result of that play when any players are online. The 
player who takes a break finds a different world upon return from that 
break. 
The number of participants in virtual worlds worldwide is in the tens 
of millions,2o and many of the participants seem to spend more time in 
virtual worlds than they do working in the real world or truly engaged in 
their own real communities. 21 Some seem to view virtual worlds as more 
real, or at least more desirable, than the real world. According to Profes-
17. See, e.g., Second Life, http://www.second1ife.com (last visited Oct. 2, 
2006) (noting example of teleportation as mode of transportation). 
18. See The Sims Online, http://www.thesims.ea.com (last visited Oct. 2, 
2006) (noting example of virtual world that more closely mirrors real world). 
19. Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Soci-
ety on the Cyberian Frontier 5-6, CESifo Working Paper No. 618 (2001), http://www. 
cesifo-group.de/ pls/ guestci! download/ CESifo%20Working% 20Papers%20200 1/ 
CESifo%20Working%20Papers%20December%20200 1 / cesifo_wp618. pdf [herein-
after Castronova, Virtual Worlds]. 
20. See Noveck, supra note 16, at 6-13 (noting existence of 20-30 million regu-
lar participants in virtual worlds in 2004 article and that this number is quickly 
growing). 
21. See id. (noting time spent by participants in virtual worlds and their own 
real communities). 
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sor Castronova's 2001 study of Norrath, the virtual world in Everquest, 
"some 20 percent of Norrath's citizens consider it their place of residence; 
they just commute to Earth and back."22 While they may work in the real 
world, they live in the virtual world. 
Still other players may reasonably be said to work in virtual worlds. 
Professor Castronova is an economist whose academic interest in virtual 
worlds involves both the micro and macroeconomic aspects of those 
worlds. He notes that "play" in virtual worlds leads to the accumulation of 
virtual assets, assets that may be saleable in real world markets, even if 
discouraged or banned by the platform owner. A player with an asset may 
sell that asset for real world currency to another player.23 The two players' 
avatars then meet somewhere in the virtual world to transfer the asset. 
This is a way that those with the time to play more hours and develop 
more assets can profit from that play by transferring the assets to those 
who want a shortcut to virtual assets, that is, to people with more money 
than time to play. 
Online auctions of assets, particularly of the currencies of virtual 
worlds,24 allow the calculation of rates of exchange between real and vir-
tual world currencies. Using those exchange rates, the values of both vir-
tual world work (play) and virtual assets in real world terms may be 
calculated. Castronova's analysis revealed an effective hourly wage in Nor-
rath of $3.42 per hour,25 more than many third world countries.26 He 
also developed an estimate for the virtual gross national product of Nor-
rath and found it to be about equal to that of Russia.27 
Of course, wherever there is money, there are likely to be disputes 
and even litigation. In fact, there has already been litigation over virtual 
property, and in other countries, even criminal prosecution over such 
property.28 Players have also seemed to see the acts of other players as 
22. Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 19, at 3 (noting significance of vir-
tual worlds to participants). 
23. For a further discussion of virtual world assets, see infra notes 212-14 and 
accompanying text. 
24. For a further discussion of online auctions, with particular reference to 
virtual world currencies, see infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. 
25. See Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 19, at 35 (calculating values of 
both virtual world work and assets in real world terms). 
26. For a further discussion of how this difference has not gone unnoticed 
and the labor of citizens of the third world has been used to develop virtual world 
assets for sale in the developed world, see infra notes 219-20 and accompanying 
text. 
27. See Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 19, at 33 (estimating virtual gross 
national product of Norrath). 
28. For a further discussion of an operation in Mexico using a virtual world to 
make real world money and a suit filed, but later dropped, when the platform 
owner acted to end the profit making, see infra notes 219-20 and accompanying 
text. See also Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185, 191 
(2004) [hereinafter Castronova, Right to Play] ("The Korean police actively prose-
cute people who hack into games, and provide higher punishments in cases where 
valuable game items are destroyed or transferred."). 
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criminal in a surprisingly real sense. The LambdaMOO rape case is the 
prime example. In that incident, a player playing through the character 
known as "Mr. Bungle" altered the computer code for the game, gained 
control over two female characters and "raped" one of them.29 The 
"rape," in the nongraphic environment of this early game, was nothing 
more than a textual description of the virtual act. The player controlling 
the virtual "victim" was reported to have suffered emotionally, and the re-
action by other members of the LambdaMOO virtual community was 
strong.30 Eventually, the "rapist" was killed, that is, his character was elimi-
nated from the game.31 
B. The Future 
Virtual world play is likely to grow greatly in the foreseeable future. A 
projection based on revenue suggested that there would be a tripling of 
play between 2002 and 2006.32 While such a rate of growth would eventu-
ally be slowed by market saturation, there is every reason to expect growth, 
even significant growth, to continue in virtual worlds. Continuing im-
provement in the graphics environments of the games, making the envi-
ronments more "real," is likely to make the games even more attractive 
alternatives to reality.33 
As these games grow in popularity and in the investment of individual 
time, there is also likely to be a growth in litigation based on events involv-
ing virtual worlds. Professor Balkin suggests various categories of disputes 
involving the owners/developers of the games (platform owners), players 
of the game and the government. 
[T] here can be disputes: 
(1) between the platform owner and the state about how the 
game space is designed and maintained; 
29. For a brief discussion of the "rape" in LambdaMOO, see Philip Giordano, 
Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 'll'll 60-
62. For a more extensive discussion of the "rape" and of LambdaMOO, see gener-
ally JULIAN DIBBLE, My TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD (1999). 
30. See Giordano, supra note 29, 'll 60 (describing virtual world rape scenario). 
31. See id. 'll 62 (noting sanctions for virtual world rape incident). It does 
appear that the player then reentered the game in another identity. See id. 'll 62 
n.162. 
32. See Caroline Bradley & A. Michael Froomkin, Virtual Worlds, Real Rules, 49 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 103, 126-27 (2004) (citing THEMIS GROUP, THE THEM IS REpORT 
2 (2002» (projecting growth of virtual world play). 
33. What may serve to limit this growth is the development of other commu-
nal electronic activities. Whether this negates projections is a matter of definition. 
For example, if these virtual worlds replace video games in popularity, it might be 
argued that any projections of continued video game growth were false. On the 
other hand, the change may be seen as simply an evolution of video games into a 
more advanced format, and the projections may be seen as borne out. 
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(2) between the players and the state about whether players may 
participate in certain game spaces and what they may do inside 
them; 
(3) between players and platform owners about what players and 
platform owners may do (and not do) in the game space; 
(4) between players about whether the in-game activities of one 
violated the legal rights of another; 
(5) between the platform owner and third parties not playing the 
game who complain about activities within the game space that 
harm the third party legally protected interests; and 
(6) between players and third parties not playing the game who 
claim that the player in-game activities harmed the third party 
legally protected interests.34 
The first two categories are most likely to raise constitutional issues. 
Given state concerns over the effects of any number of media types on 
youth, it would be a great surprise if there was not action in this arena. 
Since the advent of comic books, if not earlier, these concerns have been 
raised by each new medium.35 Certain aspects of the third category also 
raise constitutional issues. There are arguments that the platform owners, 
like the government, cannot limit the expression of players.36 In re-
sponse, the owners can be expected to raise their own First Amendment 
defenses.37 
Outside the constitutional arena, Balkin suggests that there may be 
actions brought based on, inter alia, copyright, defamation and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and that the continuation of a vir-
tual world might be subject to control ·of a bankruptcy court.38 This 
likelihood of legal action is increased by arguments that theories of real 
world property should apply to assets in virtual worlds,39 and suggestions 
that even criminal law may have application to virtual world disputes.4o 
There is also the real possibility of the development of dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms within the virtual worlds. The most obvious method of 
34. Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 
67 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Law and Liberty] (suggesting categories of disputes 
involving platform owners, players and government). 
35. For a further discussion of the concerns raised by the exposure of chil-
dren to harmful media, see infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. 
36. For a further discussion of arguments as to why platform owners, like the 
government, cannot limit the expression of players, see infra notes 83-107 and ac-
companying text. 
37. For a further discussion of the platform owners' First Amendment de-
fenses, see infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text. 
38. See Balkin, Law and Liberty, supra note 34, at 1205. 
39. For a further discussion of applying real world property rules to assets in 
virtual worlds, see infra notes 212-26 and accompanying text. 
40. For a further discussion of the potential for the application of criminal 
law to events in the virtual world arena, see infra notes 227-33 and accompanying 
text. 
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resolving disputes would be through actions of the platform owner. A 
player may be provided the opportunity to complain to the platform 
owner about the actions of another player. If the platform owner decides 
that the other player has committed a wrong, and such action taken by the 
platform owner is consistent with the end user license agreement accepted 
by the players, the owner can act to ameliorate the harm done. 
There may also be informal sanctions imposed within virtual worlds. 
If a player does something believed by other players to be unacceptable, 
the other players may refuse to interact with the offender. The avatars of 
the players who are offended can also take action against the offending 
avatar. Depending on the rules of the game, the offending avatar might 
be killed or its assets taken or destroyed. This sort of community action 
occurred after the cyberspace "rape" in LambdaMOO. While the other 
players lacked the capability to slay the "rapist," they raised a sufficient hue 
and cry that the platform owners terminated the offender's account.41 
One of the more interesting effects of the LambdaMOO "rape" was a 
decision by the owners of that platform to turn governance over to the 
players. As described in a 1998 article, the platform administrators, the 
"wizards," 
no longer act by fiat. They must have a mandate from the play-
ers, as expressed through a system of petitions and ballots .... 
To date players have approved forty-eight ballots. Laws have ad-
dressed freedom of speech, harassment, slander, rape, privacy, 
tragedies of the commons, overpopulation, homophobia, and 
the governance mechanism itself.42 
Importantly, "[a]n early ballot instituted a virtual court as a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism, and it is used frequently."43 
It is not necessary for each virtual world to develop a court system. 
Some platform owners may simply decide to allow play to continue in the 
face of disputes. Injured parties could attempt to even the score within 
the confines of the game, as though in a state of nature. Other platform 
owners may resolve disputes themselves. On receiving a complaint, a wiz-
ard may right wrongs, and a benevolent despot may be acceptable to play-
ers.44 It may also turn out that the court system first developed in 
LambdaMOO will become the model. Ajury of players could be empanel-
led to hear disputes and render decisions. A wizard may be necessary to 
41. See Giordano, supra note 29, 1 62 (noting informal sanctions imposed 
within virtual worlds). 
42. Id. I'll 63-64. It has been suggested that the wizards still exercise more 
power than may have been envisioned at the time of their abdication. See F. Greg-
ory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1,57-58 
(2004) [hereinafter Lastowka & Hunter, Laws]. 
43. Giordano, supra note 29, 'II 64. 
44. Despots are, of course, not always benevolent. But if a game has a reputa-
tion of malevolent despotism, it may have difficulty attracting new players or re-
taining veteran players. 
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enforce the rulings of the court, but the legal outcomes would be deter-
mined by the players. 
Given the likelihood of a growth in the number of disputes and the 
continuing probability that some will lead to legal action in real world 
courts, the crowding of real world court dockets with which this article 
opened may occur. If the proposed solution of banning virtual world dis-
putes from real world courts can be implemented, an examination of the 
various sorts of disputes that may arise is necessary. Each potential action 
must be examined to determine whether there is a real world effect suffi-
cient to justify the expenditure of real world judicial resources. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES 
Because virtual worlds are a form of media, it would appear likely that 
there will be significant First Amendment questions arising in any regula-
tory attempts. At least some of these issues are real world issues, even if 
they involve real world attempts to enter virtual worlds. Others, it may be 
concluded, will be purely virtual, of the sort argued not to be suitable for 
real world courts. Where the issue is a real world issue, a real world solu-
tion will be suggested. Where the issue should be kept out of real world 
courts, an explanation of that conclusion will be presented. 
A. Participation Rights 
Real world First Amendment issues will arise if there is any attempt by 
the government to restrict participation in virtual worlds. First Amend-
ment rights apply here not because of any specific events in the virtual 
world but because of the nature of participation and the effect that partici-
pation may have on real people in the real world. 
I have been unsympathetic to claims of First Amendment rights for 
video game play.45 It should be recognized that even for video games, the 
program's game developer's rights are protected, as are the images the 
program displays on the screen. Playing the video game, however, may be 
seen as another matter. The player is not engaged in communication pro-
tected by the First Amendment but in activity akin to playing a pinball 
machine. This was the position accepted by a federal district court in re-
sponding to an attempt by St. Louis County, Missouri to limit children's 
access to violent video games.46 The Eighth Circuit rejected the argu-
ment, although neither court drew the proper distinction between the 
game designer's expression and the video game play of children.47 
45. See Kevin W. Saunders, Restricting Youth Access to Violent Video Games: Three 
Responses to First Amendment Concerns, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 51, 93-105 [hereinaf-
ter Saunders, Restricting Access]. 
46. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County [Interactive Digital 
1],200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003). 
47. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County [Interactive Digital 
Il], 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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There is early (relative to the development of video games) case law 
authority that the games are not protected by the First Amendment. In 
America's Best Family Showplace Corporation v. New York,48 a restaurateur was 
denied the opportunity to install forty video games because of city zoning 
ordinances that controlled their placement.49 The owner raised a First 
Amendment claim against the statute arguing that the fantasy presenta-
tions on the screen were similar to motion pictures and should be pro-
tected on the same grounds.5o The court found no attempt to pass 
information or communicate any ideas in the games.51 While motion pic-
tures are protected because they may be used to convey ideas and affect 
public opinion, the court stated that: "In no sense can it be said that video 
games are meant to inform. Rather, a video game, like a pinball game, a 
game of chess, or a game of baseball, is pure entertainment with no infor-
mational element."52 
Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brackton53 considered a similar free 
expression claim in reviewing the denial of a license for video games in an 
arcade. The court saw the games as lacking a communicative element and 
held that they should face the same lack of protection accorded the physi-
cal activities of roller skating and recreational dancing.54 While the court 
saw video games as more technologically advanced than chess or pinball, 
"technological advancement alone ... does not impart First Amendment 
status to what is an otherwise unprotected game."55 Other courts soon 
followed in denying video games First Amendment protection,56 although 
some courts did hold open the possibility that future games might become 
sufficiently expressive as to merit protection.57 While it is true that mod-
ern games include stronger story lines and better artistic expression than 
Pac-Man or Fragger, that is not the telling distinction that the courts have 
suggested. 58 
48. 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
49. See id. at 171 (providing background facts of case). 
50. See id. at 173 (discussing plaintiff's First Amendment claim). 
5l. See id. (rejecting plaintiff's argument as unpersuasive). 
52. Id. at 174. 
53. 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1983). 
54. See id. at 926 (rejecting arguments that playing video games contained 
expressive elements analogous to other physical activities). 
55. Id. at 927. 
56. See, e.g., Malden Amusement Co., Inc. v. Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297 (D. 
Mass. 1983); Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605 
(Mass. 1983); Warren v. Walker, 354 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Tommy & 
Tina, Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 459 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. 1983). 
57. See Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc., 450 N.E.2d at 609-10; Warren, 354 
N.W.2d at 316-17; see also Rothner v. Chicago, 929 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing out possibility that some video games may have enough plot and art to be more 
than modern pinball machines and be protected, but not so ruling because regula-
tions in question could be justified as time, place or manner regulations). 
58. See Am. Amusement Machs. Ass'n v. Kendrick [Kendrick 1], 115 F. Supp. 2d 
943,952,954 (S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 
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The debate is best laid out in Interactive Digital Software Association v. St. 
Louis County. 59 In that case, the federal district court judge said that for 
there to be protection, there "must exist both an intent to convey a partic-
ularized message and a great likelihood that this message will be under-
stood . . .. [TJ here must be some element of information or some idea 
being communicated in order to receive First Amendment protection."6o 
The court reviewed a number of video games and found them to be more 
like sports or board games than film or television because it "found no 
conveyance of ideas, expression, or anything else that could possibly 
amount to speech."61 While a board game or sport like baseball may be 
accompanied by expression, the sport or game itself is not expression and 
does not become such even if it is the virtual baseball of a video game. 
The Eighth Circuit disagreed but missed the point. When reviewing 
the lower court's decision in Interactive Digita~ the court said that if the 
First Amendment is versatile enough to protect music, Lewis Carroll's sto-
ries and Jackson Pollock's paintings,62 "we see no reason why the pictures, 
graphic design, concept art, sounds, music, stories, and narrative present 
in video games are not entitled to similar protection."63 While the Eighth 
Circuit is correct in that the First Amendment protects all the aspects of 
the games mentioned, the court did not address the First Amendment 
protection of playing the games. If one simply put a quarter in the ma-
chine and watched the presentation, that would be protected communica-
tion from the game designer to the viewer and the parallel to film or 
television would be apt. But playing the game is not analogous and re-
quires its own analysis. 
It is important to note that improved story lines and art are not 
enough to grant modern video games First Amendment protection. Pac-
Man and Frogger had story lines and art. Neither story line was great litera-
ture and the art was not sophisticated, but such quality is not required for 
U.S. 994 (2001) (concluding that at least some video games may have advanced to 
point of meriting First Amendment protection but holding that violent games 
were unprotected because they were obscene when made available to children). 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted the position taken by the trial court, but did 
not offer its own analysis on this point, while reversing on the issue of obscenity. 
See Am. Amusement Machs. Ass'n v. Kendrick [Kendrick II], 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th 
Cir. 2001). On the obscenity issue, see generally KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS 
OBSCENIlY: LIMITING THE MEDIA's FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1996) [hereinaf-
ter SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENIlY]. 
59. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003). 
60. Id. at 1134. But if James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 
2002) (alleging liability in tort case based on communicative impact of message 
contained in game, thus, not raising issue of distinction between communication 
and activity); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 
2002) (relying on Kendrick's assumption that at least some games are protected 
with no significant further analysis); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 
167 (D. Conn. 2002) (same). 
61. Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
62. See Interactive Digital II, 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2003). 
63. [d. 
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First Amendment protection. The worst hack's written work is as pro-
tected as that of Nobel Prize winners, and doodles are as protected as 
great art, and such distinctions may sometimes be difficult to distinguish. 
As Judge Limbaugh, the district court judge in Interactive Digital, said: 
This Court has difficulty accepting that some video games do 
contain expression while others do not, and it finds that this is a 
dangerous path to follow. The First Amendment does not allow 
us to review books, magazines, motion pictures, or music and de-
cide that some of them are speech and some are not.64 
For Judge Limbaugh it was the nature of video games as a medium 
rather than the complexity of story lines and the quality of art that deter-
mined its protected status or lack thereof. Judge Limbaugh's concern is 
valid. To allow First Amendment protection to be determined by an offi-
cial view as to the complexity or worth of the story or the quality of art is to 
open the door to government abuse. There must be something about the 
medium, or at least the way in which the medium is used, that determines 
its protection. 
The existence of scripts and art does not change the fundamental 
nature of video game playas just that: game play. In a paintball operation 
where the owners put great effort into designing the terrain and provide 
an opposing team taught to respond to each of the customers' particular 
actions, the customers' play would not be an activity protected by the First 
Amendment. It would still be a game, rather than an attempt to inform or 
otherwise communicate. While the players respond to the actions of 
others, the same is also true of a baseball game. But hitting the ball to the 
shortstop is not communicating to that player a message that he or she 
should catch the ball and throw it to first. It is simply an event in the 
game. The same is true for video games: the player does something that 
causes the program to respond in a certain way, but the player is not com-
municating with anyone.65 
The sort of distinction suggested here has recently been recognized 
in another context. In Willis v. Town of Marshall,66 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the town's ban on a person 
64. Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
65. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (rec-
ognizing that computer codes serve more than one function). Computer code 
may certainly be used to communicate with those who understand it. Even if a 
novel is written completely in code, it should be protected by the First Amend-
ment. Code that presents graphics should also be protected. There is, however, a 
functional aspect to code. Corley concerned code that decrypted DVD films, and 
the court held that function to be unprotected by the First Amendment. The code 
through which a video game reacts to a player firing a weapon also seems func-
tional and may be seen as unprotected. For a further discussion of this issue see 
Saunders, Restricting Access, supra note 45, at 102-04. 
66. 426 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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from the community center.67 The town held regular dances on Friday 
evenings, with music provided by local bands.68 The town received several 
complaints regarding Willis's sexually provocative dancing.69 Willis 
claimed that the ban, based on her dancing, violated her First Amend-
ment rights. 7o In its analysis, the court distinguished the activities of the 
band from those of the dancers on the floor.71 
With regard to the band, the court recognized that music is a form of 
protected expression and that Willis had a First Amendment right to listen 
to that expression.72 The court also recognized that dancing, in some 
contexts ranging from "ballet [to] striptease, when performed for the ben-
efit of an audience," is protected expression.73 Turning to the situation at 
issue, the court said: 
Willis, however, was not a performer in any meaningful sense-
she was simply dancing for her own enjoyment. The question, 
then, is whether this kind of social or recreational dancing is enti-
tled to First Amendment protection. 
This court has stated that "recreational dancing, although 
containing a 'kernel' of expression, is not sufficiently communi-
cative to bring it within the protection of the First 
Amendment."74 
This is the distinction suggested for video game play. The programmer is 
engaged in First Amendment protected activity, but the player is not com-
municating anything to anyone. Indeed the dancer seems to have a more 
reasonable claim to communication than the player. The complaints over 
her dance seem to have been over sexually provocative movements con-
veyed to others. The violent video game player communicates no 
message. 
Despite there being little that should be protected in video game play, 
I believe that participation in virtual worlds should enjoy the full protec-
tion of the First Amendment. The difference is in the truly interactive 
nature of virtual worlds. While there is no one there with whom the video 
game player, in a game such as Doom, communicates, there is a great deal 
of communication in virtual worlds, and this communication may be of 
great value. While the model for the video game may be the pinball ma-
chine or, when it is player against player, baseball, the best low-tech model 
for virtual worlds might be puppets. 
67. See id. at 253-55 (reciting background facts of case). 
68. See id. at 253-54. 
69. See id. at 254-55. 
70. See id. at 255. 
7l. See id. at 259-60. 
72. See id. at 260. 
73. [d. at 257. 
74. [d. (quoting D.C. Rest. Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 953 F.2d 140, 144 
(4th Cir. 1991)). 
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Children, who may have a difficult time talking with an adult about a 
sensitive subject, are sometimes given the opportunity to express them-
selves to a hand puppet. That low-tech virtual world provides a better me-
dium for communication than a real conversation with a therapist. While 
not equating participants in virtual worlds with children, there may be in-
dividuals who find they can communicate some ideas or issues better 
through their virtual selves than in the real world. While the direct effects 
of that communication will be in the virtual world, what they express to 
others and what responses they get from others may have an effect in the 
real world. Participation may then be a form of real world communica-
tion, through a virtual medium, that has all the same effects as other 
speech protected by the First Amendment.75 
It is interactivity with others that gives virtual worlds value worthy of 
First Amendment protection. This is different from hitting a ball to the 
shortstop or firing at another player in paintball or on a virtual battlefield. 
It is the player's communication of ideas or feelings or the passing of in-
formation that gives it value. There is an apt similarity to the protection 
the First Amendment provides to anonymous communication through 
leaflets and other print media. People may be able to say some things 
when they are not directly attributable to the speaker that they would not 
say if they were identified. The unwillingness to identify oneself does not 
mean that the message lacks value. 
There is no irony in the idea that it is interactivity that gives virtual 
worlds their First Amendment status. It is true that interactivity has been 
offered as a rationale for limiting video game play, but the interactivity 
plays different roles in the two cases. In virtual worlds, interactive commu-
nication provides value, while the argument with video games was that in-
teractivity increases the likelihood that real world effects of media violence 
will be especially borne out in that more involved medium.76 
Judge Posner addressed the argument that the interactivity of video 
games raises a particular concern over media violence causing violence in 
the real world more than the passive media of film or television. Judge 
Posner rejected the interactivity distinction between video games and the 
passive media: 
Maybe video games are different. They are, after all, interactive. 
But this point is superficial, in fact erroneous. All literature 
(here broadly defined to include movies, television, and other 
photographic media, and popular as well as high brow literature) 
is interactive; the better it is, the more interactive. Literature 
when it is successful draws the reader into the story, makes him 
75. While games that more closely mirror the real world, such as The Sims 
Online, may seem to be the best cases for this argument, games conducted in a 
more fantasy-based world may also have the same sort of value. There is still com-
munication and interaction among players that may have value for real people. 
76. See Saunders, Restricting Access, supra note 45, at 61-78. 
HeinOnline -- 52 Vill. L. Rev. 202 2007
202 VILlANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 52: p. 187 
identifY with the characters, invites him to judge them and quar-
rel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the 
reader's own.77 
The distinction is not superficial, and Posner's response relies on 
equivocation. He uses the word "interactive" in two different senses. 
When he says that literature is interactive, he means that the reader em-
pathizes with a character. But the sense of "interactive" in arguments re-
garding the danger of video game play is that of participation in the 
action. The audience in a play empathizes, while the cast participates, and 
the interaction of the actor with others cast members is far different from 
the empathy the audience may feel. Training pilots rely not simply on 
reading flight manuals or hearing and empathizing with the experiences 
of veteran pilots. The value of interactivity in the participatory sense is 
shown by the reliance, instead, on flight simulators. The experiences are 
different in type and the participatory experience is more likely to lead to 
the proper response in actual flight. 78 
While the dangers of interactivity may still be present in virtual world 
participation,79 there is an additional value to the interactivity present in 
virtual worlds that does not exist for video games. The two issues differ. 
Interactivity may give a medium value for First Amendment purposes. In-
teractivity may also be a source of danger arising from the medium. Vir-
tual worlds and video games differ as to the first, while they may raise the 
same concerns for the second. 
B. The Rights of Designers and Platform Owners and the Freedom of 
Expression Within Virtual Worlds 
It is also clear that platform owners and virtual world designers have 
First Amendment rights. Their creations maintain the story lines, or at 
least the backgrounds against which story lines develop, and the artwork 
that defenders of video games argue provide First Amendment protections 
77. Kendrick II, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001). 
78. Even accepting Judge Posner's views on the interactivity of all good litera-
ture or film, violent video games may still pose particular dangers. Even if there 
was not a qualitative difference, there is a quantitative difference in the identifica-
tion that results from participation, and that may make the experience more likely 
to produce aggression. Psychological studies do show that subjects who identifY 
with a media aggressor are more likely to become aggressive, and in video games 
the players are the media aggressors. See, e.g., J.P. Leyens & S. Picus, Identification 
with the Winner of a Fight and Name Mediation: Their Differential Effects upon Subsequent 
Aggressive Behavior, 12 BRlT.J. OF Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 374, 374 (1973) (find-
ing "[mlore aggression was exhibited by subjects who identified more strongly \vith 
the winner of the fight" (cited in Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video Games 
and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings, and Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. OF 
PERSONALIIT & Soc. PSYCHOL. 772 (2000»). 
79. For a discussion of the dangers of interactivity in virtual world participa-
tion, see infra notes 184-211 and accompanying text. 
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to that medium.8o Certainly this medium has sufficient content to merit 
protection. 
The interesting issues regarding the rights of designers and platform 
owners are found in the conflict that may arise between those rights and 
the rights of players. An actual situation recounted to raise the issue is 
that of The Alphaville Herald. 81 The Herald was a weblog reporting on 
events in the virtual town of Alphaville in the game The Sims Online. The 
blog claimed that there was unseemly activity going on in Alphaville involv-
ing sex talk by avatars controlled by underage players. The owners of The 
Sims Online responded by ending the blogger's right to participate in the 
game. 
If the government of a state or of the United States took punitive 
action against the blogger, absent some compelling interest, there would 
certainly be a First Amendment violation. But what about the action by 
the platform owner? The problem with finding such a violation is the 
State Action Doctrine-the principle that only the government can violate 
an individual's constitutional rights.82 Individuals can be found to have 
violated each other's statutory rights, but the Constitution addresses only 
the government. 
In response to the limitation of the State Action Doctrine, it has been 
suggested83 that guidance can be drawn from Marsh v. Alabama.84 Marsh 
involved the company town of Chickasaw, Alabama, a town completely 
owned by a ship-building company.85 Workers lived in the houses and 
merchants rented store space on the main street.86 There was not a com-
plete divorce from government, as there was a United States Post Office 
and the town's law enforcement officer was deputized by the county.87 
Marsh was a Jehovah's Witness who was convicted of criminal trespass 
80. For a discussion of video games as compared to other protected and un-
protected forms of media, see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
81. See Jack Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual 
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REv. 2043, 2075-76 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Virtual Liberty] 
(discussing events surrounding Alphaville Herald (citing Amy Harmon, A Real Life 
Debate on Free Expression in a Cyberspace City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at AI». 
82. While specific wording, such as "Congress shall make no law" or "No state 
shall deny" makes it clear that the intention of certain provisions was to speak to 
government, the more general principle may be traced to the Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (declaring civil rights legislation from post-Civil War era 
unconstitutional) . 
83. See, e.g., Peter S. Jenkins, The Virtual World as a Company Town: Freedom of 
Speech in Massively Multiple On-Line Role Playing Games, 8 J. INTERNET L. 1, 11-14 
(2004) (comparing rationales in Marsh, such as need to "receive ... all the infor-
mation necessary to make informed decisions" and "accessibility of the town to 
members of the general public who did not reside there" to issue of freedom of 
expression within online role playing games). 
84. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
85. See id. at 502 (discussing facts of case). 
86. See id. at 502-03 (describing "characteristics" of town). 
87. See id. (detailing government contact with town). 
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based on her proselytizing on the main street.88 The Supreme Court re-
versed her conviction, holding that this sort of company town was also 
subject to the strictures of the First Amendment.89 
The suggested application to virtual worlds is based on perceived simi-
larities between company towns and virtual worlds. The residents of 
Chickasaw spent their working, shopping and home lives in the town. If 
there was to be a space for free speech, it would have had to have been in 
the town. It does seem that there are people who spend almost as great a 
portion of their time in virtual worlds,9o but that should not be enough to 
make platform owners state actors. The strength of Marsh, and certainly 
its extension to virtual spaces with no deputized law enforcement officers, 
is called into question by the shopping mall casesyl While the first of 
those cases, Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley 
Plaza, Inc.,92 seemed to signal an extension of Marsh to malls as the func-
tional equivalents of downtowns, that case was later overruled by Hudgens 
v. National Labor Relations Board.93 If malls, which despite any fantasy as-
pects do exist in the real world, are not state actors, it would seem odd for 
virtual malls and the virtual worlds in which they may exist to be consid-
ered agents of the state. 
On top of the difficulties in applying Marsh to virtual worlds, there is 
the general reluctance of the courts to find state action in other contexts. 
While there was a period in which various entities were found to be so 
involved with the government or to be serving essential government func-
tions that they were held to be state actors,94 these claims have been re-
88. See id. at 503-04 (discussing Appellant'S actions and procedural history). 
89. See id. at 509-10 ("In our view the circumstance that the property rights to 
the premises where the deprivation of liberty ... took place, were held by others 
than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to 
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties .... "). 
90. For a discussion of game players spending large amounts of time online, 
see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
9l. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319-25 (1968) (holding that picketers were free to exercise their 
First Amendment rights in front of privately owned supermarket located in shop-
ping center because shopping center was "community business block"); see also 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1975) (overruling Logan Valley and noting 
"the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and 
assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private prop-
erty used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only" (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972»). 
92. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). 
93. 424 U.S. 507 (1975). 
94. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) 
(finding state action in segregation at lunch counter in city parking structure); 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462 (1953) (addressing State Action Doctrine as 
applied to pre-primary endorsement election); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 
651 (1944) (addressing State Action Doctrine as applied to primary elections). 
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jected in recent years.95 Some of this difference may be because the 
earlier cases were centered around racial discrimination. While the Equal 
Protection Clause may only apply to the states, and through the Fifth 
Amendment to the federal government, there was a recognition that such 
discrimination was wrong, whoever might be so engaged, and a willingness 
to stretch the ambit of the clause to reach other instances. Some of the 
later cases also involved racial discrimination,96 however, and the Su-
preme Court was unwilling to continue to cast the net of the clause more 
widely. 
Recognition that platform owners are not state actors has led to the 
suggestion that the State Action Doctrine should be abandoned and that 
the Constitution should speak to a broader variety of actors.97 This is not 
the first time such a suggestion has been made,98 and there are tenable 
arguments for the abandonment of the doctrine.99 The balancing of 
rights between those asserting a constitutional violation by a perhaps pri-
vate actor and the rights of that actor, and the suggestion that applying the 
Constitution to a wider variety of actors, however, would result in a general 
weakening of constitutional rights and speaks in favor of retaining the 
95. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988) (holding NCAA's 
actions were not state action); S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 
U.S. 522, 547 (1987) (holding United States Olympic Committee was "not a gov-
ernmental actor"); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982) (holding 
private school was not state actor). 
96. See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-77 (1972) (concluding 
that private club's refusal to serve guest based on race did not violate Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
97. See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural 
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 
1263, 1268 (2000) ("Instead of repeatedly trying to demonstrate that seemingly 
private activity is actually public, we could instead focus on the benefits we might 
derive as a people from using the Constitution to debate fundamental societal val-
ues, without relying so heavily on whether the activity is categorized as public or 
private.") . 
98. For a discussion of various theories regarding the scope of constitutional 
limitations on other than strictly governmental actors, that is, to those not em-
ployed by or working closely with the government, see, e.g., LARRy ALEXANDER & 
PAUL HORTON, WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND 6 (1988) (discussing 
three different "models" of Constitution, dubbed "Legalist Model," "Naturalist 
Model" and "Governmental Model"); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 
242-51 (1996) (discussing "public function argument" and "permission argument" 
for treating private business as state actor); Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, 
the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. 
COMMENT. 329, 342-49 (1993) (attempting "to show that, in spite of the conceptual 
barriers to maintaining the public-private distinction, it is possible to mark out a 
particular realm of actions to which the Constitution may be held to apply and 
outside of which it may not apply"). 
99. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 
505 (1985) ("It is time to again ask why infringements of the most basic values-
speech, privacy, and equality-should be tolerated just because the violator is a 
private entity rather than the government."). 
HeinOnline -- 52 Vill. L. Rev. 206 2007
206 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 52: p. 187 
State Action Doctrine. IOO At any rate, the courts have not indicated a will-
ingness to follow the suggestions of those who would expand the scope of 
the dictates of the Constitution, and there seems to be little likelihood that 
the State Action Doctrine will be completely abandoned. 
In addition to arguments against the general rejection of the state 
action requirement, certain First Amendment factors speak against the ex-
tension of the limitations on government to platform owners. The pur-
pose, or purposes, of the First Amendment speak either solely or most 
forcefully to the government. The greatest danger in the suppression of 
expression, and the one arguably motivating the First Amendment, is the 
possibility that the state will use it to squelch dissent and preserve itself 
from change that may be desired by the people. IOI Undoubtedly, the con-
centration of media power also has a private effect of limiting expression, 
but the Supreme Court has been unwilling to allow regulation of election 
related content of newspapers. 102 While earlier scarcity of the broadcast 
spectrum and the public ownership of the airwaves led to the approval of 
Federal Communications Commission regulations requiring coverage of 
issues of public interest, balance and opportunities for response to posi-
tions aired,103 such measures are no longer seen as required with the 
emergence of cable television. 104 The theory seems to be that there are 
now enough electronic media outlets that variety is assured. lOS If that is 
the approach to media in the real world, it should seem unlikely that the 
Court would see a need to impose the limits of the First Amendment upon 
the operators of virtual worlds. Just as consumers of electronic media can 
choose their outlets, participants in virtual worlds can choose their worlds; 
the platform owners' approaches to free expression may playa role in that 
100. For a response to Chemerinsky's arguments, see William P. Marshall, Di-
luting Constitutonal Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking State Action ", 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 
558, 559 (1985) (arguing that Chemerinsky's proposal may" [a] t best ... dilute 
existing liberties [and] "at worst ... lead to a more restrictive definition and pro-
tection of those rights"). 
lO1. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. 
B. FOUND. REs. J. 521, 528 (examining theory that value in freedom of expression 
is that it "performs in checking the abuse of official power"). 
102. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding 
"right of reply" statute, which forced newspapers to allow candidates to respond to 
newspaper attacks, unconstitutional); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966) 
(holding that "no test of reasonableness can save a state law from invalidation as a 
violation of the First Amendment when that law makes it a crime for a newspaper 
editor to do no more than urge people to vote one way or another in a publicly 
held election"). 
lO3. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (describing 
broadcasting's fairness doctrine). 
lO4. See Turner Broad, Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,638-39 (1984) (explain-
ing refusal to apply weaker standard for testing broadcasting regulation, as found 
in Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90, to cable regulation). 
105. See id. at 637-39 (explaining that "broadcast cases are inapposite in the 
present context because cable television does not suffer from the inherent limita-
tions that characterize the broadcast medium"). 
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choice. Some participants may seek worlds with strong speech protection, 
but parents may choose more restrictive worlds for their children. 
At least one reason for the failure of the class of state actors to con-
tinue to expand was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 106 Once 
the statute made private discrimination illegal, at least in the business 
arena, there was no reason to inquire into whether or not a business could 
be considered a state actor subject to the dictates of the Equal Protection 
Clause. A statute, therefore, might provide the free expression rights play-
ers want; that is, a statute could require that the platform owners allow 
free expression. I 07 
The platform owners, however, would have their own constitutional, 
even First Amendment, defense to such a statute. Various organizations 
have claimed that the freedom of association shields them from the re-
quirements of state statutes barring discrimination. Some of these organi-
zations have been unsuccessful. The Jaycees could not claim such 
protection because they were too large and nonselective to be seen as an 
intimate association, and were not sufficiently focused on political or 
other expression to enjoy the freedom due an expressive association. 1 OS 
The Boy Scouts, on the other hand, were successful in their assertion of an 
association right that allowed them to exclude gays. 109 The Boy Scouts' 
position against homosexuality would be compromised by requiring them 
to accept gays. 
While it has been suggested that the Boy Scout case could apply to 
virtual worlds, 11 0 the more applicable case might be Hurley v. Irish-Ameri-
can Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. 111 In Hurley, the association 
running the Boston Saint Patrick's Day parade, the South Boston Allied 
War Veterans Council, refused to allow a group of gays, lesbians and bisex-
uals to march under their own identifying banner.112 The excluded 
106. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000(a)-6 (2000) (prohibiting "discrimination 
or segregation in places of public accommodation"). 
107. See Balkin, Virtual Liberty, supra note 81, at 2079 (finding such approach 
to be suggested by Berman, supra note 97, at 1302-05). 
108. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-29 (1984) (detailing that 
application of Minnesota Human Rights Act does not abridge male members' free-
dom of intimate association or freedom of expressive association); see also Bd. of 
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544-49 (1987) (explain-
ing how application of Unruh Act does not interfere unduly with members' free-
dom of private association or right of expressive association). 
109. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (applying New 
jersey's public accommodation law to require Boy Scouts to accept Dale as assistant 
scoutmaster violated Scout's freedom of expressive association). 
110. See Balkin, Virtual Liberty, supra note 81, at 2088 ("If legislators attempt to 
regulate virtual spaces along the model of public accommodation laws, we may 
well see platform owners making Dale-in-cyberspace claims."). 
Ill. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
112. See id. at 560-61 (noting history of parade organization and exclusion of 
gay, lesbian and bisexual group). While denied the ability to participate in the 
1992 parade, the group "obtained a state-court order to include its contingent, 
which marched 'uneventfully' among the year's 10,000 participants and 750,000 
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group sued under a state anti-discrimination statute and won.u 3 The Su-
preme Court, however, held that the application of the statute violated the 
rights of the parade organizers. 114 The Court determined that, "[r]ather 
like a composer, the Council selects the expressive units of the parade 
from potential participants, and though the score may not produce a par-
ticularized message, each contingent's expression in the Council's eyes 
comports with what merits celebration on that day."115 
While the Court's description of the creative role of a parade orga-
nizer may have gone beyond reality, it seems to apply to the platform de-
signer or owner. The platform establishes a virtual world, and those 
establishing that world have a vision for it. While the platform owner al-
lows players to participate in the virtual world, the owner/designer's vision 
may be inconsistent with some potential virtual acts by the players, or even 
with real world acts by players that have an effect in or on the virtual 
world. Under Hurley, it would seem that the platform owner could ex-
clude the inconsistent acts by censoring on an act-by-act basis or simply by 
terminating the actor's right to participate. 
There are also interesting suggestions that, while the Constitution 
may not legally limit the actions of someone who is not a state actor, the 
Constitution should still serve as an ethical or aspirational guide. 116 That 
approach has some appeal. In fact, it may well be that the belief that the 
Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against government discrimination 
on the basis of race should apply to non-government actors both led to the 
expansion of state action in that area and contributed to the idea that 
even individuals should not discriminate on that basis. 117 Similarly, the 
dictates of the First Amendment regarding free expression may lead to 
spectators." See id. at 561 (detailing events surrounding group's parade 
application) . 
113. See id. at 561-63 (addressing group's arguments under state public ac-
commodation laws which prohibited discrimination on basis of sexual 
orientation) . 
114. See id. at 566,581 ("Disapproval of a private speaker's statement does not 
legitimize use of the Commonwealth's power to compel the speaker to alter the 
message by including one more acceptable to others."). 
115. [d. at 574 (describing right of private speaker to "shape" his or her 
message). 
116. See Berman, supra note 97, at 1290 (examining "constitutive constitution-
alism" principles). The concept of constitutive constitutionalism involves "the idea 
that the Constitution might appropriately be viewed as a touchstone for articulat-
ing constitutive values and for structuring public debate about fundamental social 
and political issues." [d. 
117. See Chemerinsky, supra note 99, at 537 (arguing that invocation of state 
action doctrine to deny relief puts courts on one side of dispute and favors rights 
of those who would discriminate over victim). Elimination of the State Action Doc-
trine would allow the courts to address the substance of the claim and the valued 
rights centrally at issue. See id. at 540 (depicting benefits of eliminating doctrine). 
Further, openly balancing the competing interests would lead to a better under-
standing of the rights at stake. See id. (comparing liberties of violators with those of 
discriminated individuals). 
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cries of censorship if a retail outlet refuses to sell particular magazines or 
video games. While the action of the store is censorship, the First Amend-
ment does not speak to such a private decision. Nonetheless, the values 
embodied in the protections may have wider application, and private enti-
ties seem to be expected to give these values at least some respect and be 
ready to accept criticism for decisions contrary to their aspirations. 
In this regard, the Constitution, specifically the First Amendment, 
may provide non-binding guidance. Perhaps the role that the free expres-
sion provisions should play in virtual worlds is similar to the role natural 
law seems to play in the real world. The willingness of the courts to find 
non-textual restrictions upon government actions, in cases such as Griswold 
v. Connecticut I 18 and Lawrence v. Texas, 119 may be seen as the acceptance of 
natural law, a law found outside the bounds of positive law which serves as 
a limitation on that positive law.12o Similarly, the Constitution, as it em-
bodies strongly-held values of the American people, could be seen as a 
guide to, or a natural law for, the development of laws or rules internal to 
the operation of virtual worlds. 
Lastly, there are contract provisions setting out the rights of partici-
pants in virtual worlds against the platform owners. These contracts may 
give the owner the right to limit the actions of players and may provide for 
censorship or the exclusion of a player from the virtual world. Thus real 
world contracts control what happens in the virtual world; if litigation 
arises in the virtual world, it does so over a provision in the real-world 
contract rather than over a virtual world dispute. Substantively, it has 
been argued that these contracts are adhesion contracts, and a provision 
might be voided on that basis.121 It is true that contracts for online ser-
vices generally do not permit negotiation; instead, they demand that the 
"accept" toggle be clicked on in order to access the web site.122 Because 
adhesion contracts are not automatically void, however, they generally will 
only be nullified when courts find them to be unconscionable.123 Put al-
ternatively, "[aJ court will find adhesion only when the party seeking to 
rescind the contract establishes that the other party used 'high pressure 
tactics,' or 'deceptive language,' or that the contract is unconsciona-
118. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
119. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
120. For a general analysis of the role of natural law in shaping and limiting 
positive law, see A.P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAw: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY (1951). 
121. See Jenkins, supra note 83, at 5 (stating that End User Licensing Agree-
ment ("EULA") "is a contract of adhesion that is imposed on the player without 
the possibility of negotiation"). 
122. See, e.g., id. (noting process that requires user to click "I Accept" button 
with regard to EULA before being able to access game). 
123. See, e.g., Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(providing that contracts generally can only be voided when deemed 
unconscionable) . 
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ble."124 Also relevant is whether alternatives were available to the "co-
erced" party.125 Because of the availability of alternatives to any particular 
virtual world and the choice of making some other use of one's time, it 
seems unlikely that the unconscionability threshold will be met. Further-
more, a demand for free speech in a virtual world is an alteration of the 
contract that goes beyond a request to be released from an adhesion 
contract. 
C. The Application oj First Amendment Exceptions 
1. Clear and Present Danger 
One exception to First Amendment protection of play in virtual 
worlds would be for material that meets the "clear and present danger" 
test.126 Qualification under this exception, however, requires the danger 
to be a real world danger. If a particular virtual world allowed for a strong 
freedom of speech and were governed by the players rather than the plat-
form owner, the possibility of insurrection in the virtual world would exist. 
The avatars could rise up and overthrow the virtual world's regime. 
Speech directed at such an uprising, as opposed to speech directed at the 
encouragement of change in the virtual world through the political pro-
cess allowed in the platform, would be a "clear and present danger" in the 
virtual world. If the virtual world employed legal standards similar to 
those which the First Amendment imposes on the real world ofthe United 
States, the virtual regime could suppress the speech if the speech was likely 
to incite imminent, serious and unlawful action. This would, of course, 
require the existence of either a virtual world court willing to override the 
will of the regime or a platform owner similarly willing to impose free 
speech principles on the virtual world government. 
What is critical for the separation proposed here is that any virtual 
world insurrection must be insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of real 
124. Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 
Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)) (recognizing 
contracts of adhesion). 
125. See id. at 169 (determining whether "coerced" party was on notice of of-
fending provision was factor to consider when deeming adhesion contract 
unconscionable) . 
126. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (considering previ-
ously established principle that "constitutional guarantees of free speech and press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"). This may be 
better seen not as an exception but as a way of justitying suppression of material 
that falls within the ambit of the First Amendment. That is, while obscenity falls 
within an exception to the First Amendment, the speech subjected to the clear and 
present danger test may well have political content or otherwise be the sort of 
speech afforded the Amendment's protection. The speech may be suppressed not 
because it lacks the sort of content that is the subject of the Free Expression 
Clauses, but because the speech poses too great a danger and may be justified by 
this First Amendment version of the strict scrutiny test. 
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world courts. No matter how totalitarian a virtual world regime may be, 
there are no "clear and present danger" grounds for a real world court to 
suppress or protect dissenting speech in a virtual world. This conclusion 
assumes that the state action issues already discussed are resolved as ar-
gued above. This is also not to say, however, that there cannot be a con-
tract action based on the user agreement. 127 
Having ruled out virtual world insurrection as a basis for action in the 
courts of the United States, a virtual world could be used as an arena to 
plan for and inspire an insurrection in the real world. Rather than meet-
ing in auditoria or around burning crosses in the woods, those planning 
an uprising against the United States government or the government of an 
individual state could meet in a virtual world. Assuming that the partici-
pants knew they were, and intended to be, engaged in something more 
serious than fantasy play, the speech of their participation could be sup-
pressed if the speech met the "clear and present danger" test. If the 
speech in the virtual world was likely to lead to serious, imminent, unlaw-
ful acts in the real world, the speech should provide the justification 
needed for real world governments to shut the platform down and per-
haps otherwise punish the participan ts. 128 
2. Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Turning to a true First Amendment exception that has been the basis 
for comment,129 a defamation action might arise out of statements by an 
avatar. Again, a distinction should be drawn between a defamatory state-
ment having an effect only in the virtual world and a statement having its 
effect in the real world. One avatar may say something in the virtual world 
that defames the character of another avatar. If, for example, an avatar 
falsely asserts that another avatar has found a way to produce shoddy assets 
that he or she is selling in the virtual world market, that could be the sort 
of defamation of business that would, in the real world, allow for a recov-
ery of the profits lost because others are no longer willing to pay the full 
market price for the asset. Because this is defamation within the virtual 
world, any legal action should be left to whatever courts or conflict resolu-
tion methods that are available in the virtual world. It is an avatar who lost 
his or her reputation in the virtual world, so a virtual world judgment in 
the avatar's favor should be the process for making him or her whole. 130 
127. For a discussion of contract actions based on user agreements, see supra 
notes 121-25 and accompanying text. 
128. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (describing type of advocacy that leads to 
real world punishment). 
129. See, e.g., Balkin, Virtual Liberty, supra note 81, at 2065 ("[P]eople in the 
virtual world can defame a person's real-world identity. But, equally interestingly, 
there can also be defamation against a person's game-space identity (or 
identities) ."). 
130. For a discussion of the possibility that a virtual world judgment could be 
turned into a real world gain by the sale of the virtual world award in real world 
markets, see infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. 
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It is, however, possible to use an avatar to engage in real world defa-
mation. An avatar can be made to utter a defamatory comment about an 
identified or identifiable person playing the game through another avatar 
or, for that matter, about an individual not even involved in the virtual 
world. When that happens, the person who publishes the libel through 
the avatar should be as liable as he or she would be if using any other 
medium. 
The key here is the "of and concerning" requirement in a defamation 
action. 131 If the assertion is "of and concerning" the avatar, then there is 
no real world defamation. If, however, a comment is made regarding the 
person controlling avatar X, then the "of and concerning" requirement in 
the real world may be met-so long as the referent of "the person control-
ling avatar X" is known to people in the real world. If, more straightfor-
wardly, an avatar makes a false and defamatory comment directly about an 
identified real world person, the "of and concerning" requirement in the 
real world is clearly met. To say, for example, 'john Smith is embezzling 
from the XYZ Corporation" through an avatar in a virtual world is really 
no different from saying the same thing on Radio Real World. In the two 
situations, remedies for defamation should be equally available, while 
damages may vary depending on how widely the falsehood is heard. 
A related issue here is the possibility of a suit for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. It has been argued that because people become 
very emotionally invested in their avatars,132 defamation of the avatar may 
cause emotional distress in the person who plays through that avatar. 
There would appear to be at least two problems with a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress within a virtual world. The first problem 
addresses the issue of against whom the intentional infliction occurred. 
Defamation of the avatar may have been intended to inflict emotional dis-
tress on the avatar. But that is not a real world infliction of emotional 
distress and therefore suits should not be viable in real world courts. An 
intent to inflict emotional distress on the player controlling the avatar is 
real world emotional distress. Even here, however, the game nature of the 
virtual world should raise serious concerns. 
Consider a football game in which one team is well ahead of the other 
and is in possession of the ball with time running out in the game. The 
team calls a timeout with three or four seconds left in the game in order to 
send in the field goal team, kicks successfully and adds three points to the 
131. See, e.g., Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 653 F. Supp. 552, 560-61 (N.D. II\. 
1987) (providing that "of and concerning" requirement is also known as collo-
quium requirement), affd, 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 
13 F.R.D. 311, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (stating that "general allegation that the 
alleged libellous [sic] and defamatory matter was written 'of and concerning ... 
each of them' is insufficient to satisfy" cause of action for plaintiffs). 
132. See, e.g., Balkin, Virtual Liberty, supra note 81, at 2047 ("Players identify 
with their avatars; they experience what happens to the avatars in the virtual world 
as happening to themselves."). 
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already significant margin of victory.133 Assuming that this is not an at-
tempt to exceed a point spread motivated by gambling, the only purpose 
would seem to be the intentional infliction of emotional distress upon the 
opposing team or coach. Yet it seems odd to suggest that the opposing 
team or coach in that situation should have a valid cause of action. To the 
extent that the action is permitted within the rules of the game, there is no 
formal penalty within the game; thus, there certainly should be no penalty 
outside the game either. If there is a violation of the rules of the game, a 
game-specific penalty can be imposed. The real limitations on the actions 
of one team's likelihood to subject another to ridicule or infliction of emo-
tional distress are the spirit of good sportsmanship, the fear of being on 
the receiving end of similar treatment in a future game134 and the desire 
to avoid providing the other team with any extra motivation for the next 
time the two teams play. 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress should probably be han-
dled the same way in virtual worlds. The virtual world may have a civility 
code that could either punish the person trying to inflict emotional dis-
tress through the avatars or even exclude the player from the world. Per-
haps penalties payable in the currency of the virtual world could be 
imposed. Other players may choose to treat poorly or shun the person 
intent on inflicting emotional distress. All of these possibilities, and prob-
ably others not mentioned here, would seem to be reasonable virtual 
world responses. What should not be an acceptable response, however, is 
the filing of a suit in a real world court. No matter how invested people 
may be in the virtual world, it is just a game. Players in virtual worlds are 
typically no more invested than football players at some levels of that game 
and in some parts of the country. If a football team cannot go to court 
claiming to have been treated unkindly, then there is certainly no more 
reason to let the player in a virtual world sue for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
3. Obscenity, Child Pornography and Fighting Words 
There is also room for real world courts to become involved in virtual 
worlds where obscene materials are involved. The computer screen 
images exist in the real world and where those images are obscene, those 
133. See Chris Fowler, Trivial Pursuit Before 'Canes-Cators Showdown', ESPN, 
Sept. 5, 2002, http://espn.go.com/ncf/columns/fowler_chris/1427550.html (de-
picting how University of Miami ran up score several years ago in game against 
University of Florida). While the incident may have been motivated by Florida fan 
behavior toward the Miami team, it more likely was payback for a specific play, 
occurring in the 1971 rivalry game, known as the "Florida Flop." See id. (providing 
that in 1971 game, with Florida well ahead of Miami and Florida's quarterback 
within few yards of breaking passing record, almost entire Florida team fell to 
ground as Miami snapped ball, allowing Miami to score touchdown so that Florida 
could get ball back before time ran out and Florida quarterback could set passing 
record). This author was in attendance at the "flop" game. 
134. For a discussion of such reciprocal treatment, see id. 
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responsible for their display may be prosecuted. There would seem, how-
ever, to be little likelihood of a conviction for obscenity. The images are 
of avatars rather than people, and while there is no legal reason why an 
animated image cannot be obscene,135 the appeal to the prurient interest 
required for an obscenity finding136 is less likely to be met by an animated 
image than by other images available on the Internet. 137 
Until recently, it was possible that, because the obscene images were 
viewed on a real world computer screen, a conviction could be obtained 
for the inclusion in a virtual world of images of avatars representing chil-
dren engaging in sexual acts. The Supreme Court recognized a First 
Amendment exception for non-obscene child pornography in New York v. 
Ferber,138 where the Court saw a need to suppress the market of such mate-
rial in order both to prevent the sexual abuse of children in the material's 
production and to suppress the permanent record of abuse that child por-
nography embodies. 139 Moreover, in Osborne v. Ohio,140 the Court added 
another justification for the exception. There was a concern over the use 
of child pornography to recruit and train new victims of sexual abuse. 141 
For example, pedophiles could use the materials both to try to convince 
children that sexual acts with adults are normal and to instruct the chil-
dren as to how to perform the desired acts. That concern led some courts 
to conclude that animated or virtual child pornography was unprotected 
135. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966) (concluding that when 
material is marketed to audience with particular sexual interest, prurience will be 
judged based on that group of individuals). For example, if material is marketed 
to an audience with bondage or sadomasochist interests, the fact that the material 
would not appeal to an average person does not preclude a finding of obscenity if 
the material appeals to the prurient interests of the target audience. See id. at 508-
09 ("We adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities by permitting 
the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of 
its intended and probable recipient group."). Of relevance here is the fact that the 
books in question were illustrated rather than containing actual photographs. 
While a publication without photographs is less likely to be found obscene, the 
finding is not legally precluded. Similarly, an animated film is less likely to be 
found obscene, and in fact is extremely unlikely to be found obscene for an adult 
audience. But see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-43 (1968) (providing for 
stricter standard when children are in audience). 
136. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973) (defining test for obscene 
material to include as one of its requirements that material at issue, under commu-
nity standards and taken as whole, appeals to prurient interest). 
137. For a further discussion of how children's access to such material might 
cause the material still to be deemed obscene, see infra note 147 and accompany-
ing text. 
138. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
139. See id. at 756-64 (explaining why states are entitled to greater leeway in 
regulation of pornographic depictions of children). 
140. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
141. See id. at 104, III (stating that pornographic materials may be used by 
pedophiles to seduce other children). 
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because it too could be used for the same purpose. 142 The Supreme 
Court has recently concluded, however, that virtual child pornography 
does not fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. 143 Thus, the 
possibility of virtual world child pornography would seem precluded. 
Lastly, the "fighting words" exception 144 to the First Amendment 
seems unlikely to apply to real world court actions stemming from actions 
within virtual worlds. To fall within the "fighting words" exception, speech 
must be directed at an individual and a reasonable speaker would have to 
recognize the likelihood of an immediate violent response; that is, fighting 
words are an invitation to immediate fisticuffs. 145 A comment made in a 
virtual world through an avatar would not seem to be such an invitation. 
The response, to be a real world response, would have to come from the 
person playing through the avatar to whom the comment is made. There 
is ordinarily insufficient physical proximity between the two players for any 
immediate physical, real world response. 
While there is little to no likelihood of these First Amendment excep-
tions applying to real world litigation over virtual world content, the ex-
ceptions may influence the development of any internal law within the 
virtual worlds. Those controlling the platforms may have their own rules 
dealing with virtual obscenity or child pornography and may insist on civil-
ity by barring the use of what would constitute "fighting words" if uttered 
in the real world. If these decisions by platform owners were challenged as 
infringing upon the free speech rights of players, the response would be 
the same as previously discussed above. 146 
D. Harm to Children 
1. Sexual Content 
The greatest motivation for the real world to regulate virtual worlds 
or access to virtual worlds through legislation is likely to come from any 
142. See United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating 
that criminalizing possession of images of cyber-minors engaged in sexually ex-
plicit conduct isjustified); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 76 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(stating that it is "well within Congress's power to regulate virtual pornography of 
all minors of all ages"). Both cases, which applied the Child Pornography Protec-
tion Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, in which Congress criminalized possession of porno-
graphic images appearing to be of children, have since been effectively overruled. 
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234,244,258 (2002) (finding statute to 
be overbroad and unconstitutional). 
143. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 244-56 (detailing history of child pornog-
raphy and First Amendment and explaining why virtual pornography is protected 
under First Amendment). 
144. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-74 (1942) (holding 
that "fighting words" are not protected under First Amendment). 
145. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (stating that "fight-
ing words" are those words "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and 
thereby cause a breach of the peace" (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574». 
146. For a discussion of freedom of expression from restriction by platform 
owners, see supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text. 
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perceived harm to children. For example, the level of sexual activity 
among avatars in a virtual world may be seen as inappropriate for real 
world children to be exposed to. Even if it is unlikely that the images 
resulting from virtual world activity would be held obscene when viewed by 
adults, the standard is different for children. Ginsberg v. New York147 recog-
nized that when material is distributed to children, the prurience required 
for an obscenity conviction is to be judged by the prurient interest of mi-
nors. 148 This far more inclusive test might be met by sufficiently seductive 
or sexually active avatars. 
The major problem in limiting access of juveniles to sexual material is 
the impact such limitations may have on adults. A fairly old case, Butler v. 
Michigan,149 sets the parameters.150 Butler grew out of an attempt to pro-
tect minors from material considered harmful to them. The Michigan 
statute involved prohibited the possession, sale or publication of materials 
that were obscene or "tend[ed] to incite minors to violent or depraved or 
immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of 
youth."151 Even though the defendant in Butler had not sold the material 
at issue to a child, but rather to a police officer, the trial court convicted 
Butler because it concluded that the material had a potential deleterious 
effect on youth.152 The Supreme Court concluded that Michigan could 
not attempt to protect children by preventing adult access to non-obscene 
material. 153 The state could not "reduce the adult population of Michi-
gan to reading only what is fit for childre·n."154 
Concerns over limiting adult access have proven to be a substantial 
problem for attempts to shield children from sexual material on the In-
ternet. The first such attempt was the Communications Decency Act of 
1996 (CDA), passed as a part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.155 
The CDA prohibited the transmission via any telecommunications service 
of any "image[ ] or other communication which is obscene or indecent, 
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of 
age."156 Also prohibited was the use of an "interactive computer service to 
display in a manner available" to a child under eighteen any image, or 
147. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
148. See id. at 638-39 (providing that definition of obscenity as applied to mi-
nors can be adjusted). 
149. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
150. See id. at 383-84 (stating that legislation limiting adults to reading only 
that which is fit for children violated adults' freedom of liberty). 
151. [d. at 381 (quoting MICH. PENAL CODE § 343). 
152. See id. at 382-83 (providing trial judge's reasoning). 
153. See id. at 383-84 (stating that legislation is "not reasonably restricted to 
the evil with which it is said to deal"). 
154. [d. at 383. 
155. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996). The Communications Decency Act is Title V of the Telecommunications 
Act. It is found at Section 502, 110 Stat. at 133-35. 
156. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (l)(B) (ii) (West Supp. 1997). 
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other communication that depicts or describes, In patently offensive 
terms, sexual or excretory activities or organs. 157 There were criminal 
sanctions provided for violators, but there was also a defense for anyone 
requiring "a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult 
personal identification number" for access or otherwise taking "good faith, 
reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to 
restrict or prevent access by minors."158 
The Supreme Court held the CDA unconstitutional in Reno v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union. 159 While there were a number of other con-
cerns,160 the major flaw in the statute was its effect on constitutionally 
protected adult-ta-adult communication.161 A ban on making the 
targeted material available through the Internet would clearly limit ex-
pression, and the costs of the adult identification methods that provided a 
defense might make it too expensive to publish. 162 Even the bar on send-
ing sexual material to one known to be a minor had a negative effect on 
adult-ta-adult communication, because conversation in a chat room 
known to be occupied by even one minor would have to be limited to 
material suitable to that young participant.163 
The second attempt to shield children from sexual material on the 
Internet has not fared any better. The Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA) provided penalties for "[w]hoever knowingly and with knowledge 
of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by 
means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial 
purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that 
is harmful to minors."164 COPA, too, provided a defense for content prov-
157. See id. § 223(d)(I)(B). 
158. Id. § 223(e)(5). 
159.521 U.S. 844 (1997) [Renol]. 
160. For example, the Court expressed concern over the effect of the statute 
on the provision by parents to their own children of material that might come 
within the scope of the CDA, even material parents could see as having serious 
value for their children. See id. at 878. 
161. See id. at 874 (finding burden on adult speech to be unacceptable). 
162. See id. at 885 (emphasizing interest in encouraging freedom of 
expression) . 
163. See id. at 847 (noting that most Internet forums are open to individuals 
of all ages). 
164. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd, 217 
F.3d 162 (2000), Tel/d, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) [Reno Il]. The language quoted was to 
be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231. COPA defined who would be considered to be 
making a communication for commercial purposes, limiting it to those providing 
the communication as a business and with the intent of earning a profit, but did 
not require that the person or entity actually be making a profit. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 231 (e) (2). Material harmful to minors was also defined to be: 
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, record-
ing, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is 
designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; 
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iders, requiring similar sorts of credit or identification means as in the 
CDA, or taking other reasonable and feasible measures to restrict youth 
access. 165 
The Supreme Court's initial consideration of COPA was, due to the 
approach taken by the lower court, limited to the issue of how to define 
the community in which harmfulness to minors was to be judged.166 Be-
cause the Internet has no geographic boundaries, content providers could 
be limited by the standards of the nation's most restrictive communities. 
The Supreme Court was unswayed by that concern, holding that the com-
munity standards issue did not, in itself, make COPA unconstitutionaI.l67 
There was no majority opinion explaining that conclusion. A plurality 
said there was no difference between the Internet and other federal stat-
utes regarding the mail or telephone distribution of obscenity, concluding 
that" [i] f a publisher wishes for its material to be judged only by the stan-
dards of particular communities, then it need only take the simple step of 
utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material into 
those communities."168 This could be accomplished by publishing the 
material only in a way in which delivery could be controlled. 169 Justices 
O'Connor and Breyer concurred but argued that there should be a sepa-
rate standard for the Internet community.170 
When COPA eventually found its way back to the Supreme Court, the 
Court upheld an injunction against the enforcement of the Act. 171 This 
time the majority did consider the remaining provisions and found them 
to be too great a limitation on adult access to material adults have a right 
to obtain. l72 Again, not quarreling with the government's interest in 
shielding children, the Court found burdens in the expense of age verifi-
cation and the potential chill of embarrassment in the identification pro-
cess that would be required of users. The test was then whether the 
limitation was no more restrictive than necessary to serve the government 
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with 
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an 
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition 
of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and 
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value for minors. 
47 U.S.C. § 231(e) (6). Minors were defined as persons under seventeen years of 
age. [d. 
165. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(I). 
166. See ACLU v. Reno, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) [Reno IV] (stating issue 
before court); see also ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2000) [Reno IllJ 
(concluding that statute is overbroad). 
167. See Ashcroft V. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564,578 (2002) [Ashcroft lJ. 
168. [d. at 583. 
169. See id. (stating that publisher's responsibility should not change simply 
by virtue of medium being used). 
170. See id. at 586-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
17l. See Ashcroft V. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) [Ashcroft IlJ. 
172. See id. at 675 (emphasizing COPA's heavy burdens on Internet speech). 
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interest. 173 In answering this question, the Court stated that filtering and 
blocking were less restrictive, because they placed limited restrictions on 
the receiving end instead of universal limitations at the source. 174 The 
Court also expressed a belief that filtering and blocking could be more 
effective than COPA, because forty percent of pornography on the web 
comes from outside the United States and would be beyond the impact of 
the statute. 175 Filtering, the court noted, can also address concerns over e-
mail, concerns not addressed by COPA.176 Interestingly, the Court also 
saw a circumvention problem in COPA, in that some minors may have the 
credit cards necessary to pass through the age screen. 177 It may, however, 
be questionable whether minors are more likely to be able to obtain credit 
cards than to circumvent filters, given the often greater familiarity with 
computers of at least older minors than their parents. Nonetheless, the 
Court upheld the i~unction and remanded for trial on the merits.178 
Given the expression of likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail in such 
a trial, it would appear that COPA will never serve its intended purpose. 179 
The constitutional difficulties in regulating the Internet carry over to 
virtual worlds, because these worlds are a part of the Internet. There are, 
however, differences that may make access to the virtual world more easily 
regulable. One of the approaches to filtering content on the Internet, the 
173. See id. (noting possibility that protection of children might have been 
achieved through less restrictive means). 
174. See id. at 666-68. 
175. See id. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. at 668. 
178. See id. at 656 (stating that Third Circuit was correct to affirm district 
court's decision). 
179. There were four dissenting votes in the COPA case. Justice Scalia failed 
to find any First Amendment protection for the commercial pandering of sex. See 
id. at 676 (Scalia,]., dissenting). Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O'Connor, argued that COPA's limitations on speech were modest. See 
id. at 676-91 (Breyer,]., dissenting). He failed to see much difference between 
material that is harmful to minors, as defined in the statute, and the prevailing 
definition for obscene material. See id. at 678-82 (Breyer,]., dissenting). While it is 
true that the COPA definition tracks the definition of obscenity, the COPA defini-
tion judges prurience, offensiveness and serious value on a scale that takes into 
account the age of the consumer. See id. at 678-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice 
Breyer says that material appealing to the prurience of some groups of minors will 
also appeal to the prurient interest of some groups of adults and, therefore, can be 
obscene. See id. at 679 (Breyer,]., dissenting). But the whole basis for "harmful to 
minors" statutes is that the prurient interest of minors is more easily appealed to 
and that material perfectly legal for an adult audience may be restricted for mi-
nors. Justice Breyer also argues, more convincingly, that there is not really a signif-
icant burden in the screening devices. See id. at 682-87 (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
The cost to content providers he saw as modest and the cost to consumers of an 
age verification service would be less than the cost of the filters the majority saw as 
potentially superior. See id. at 682-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also 
called into question the effectiveness of filtering and did not consider a sixty per-
cent reduction in pornography available to minors at all trivial. See id. at 687 
(Breyer,]., dissenting). 
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use of blacklists or white lists, may be more successful in this context. If 
the totality of the web must be regulated, the task of compiling and keep-
ing up to date the lists on which the filter is based is perhaps unfeasible. 
Given the regular addition of pages to the web and changes in the content 
of existing sites, any blacklist quickly becomes outdated. Use of a necessa-
rily incomplete white list keeps children from accessing what may be valua-
ble sites. But with virtual worlds, the complexity of the platforms seems 
likely to limit the number of such worlds, probably to the degree that fil-
ters based on blacklists or whitelists may be available to parents .. 
If the number of virtual worlds were to grow too large for such lists to 
be effective, there may still be opportunities to shield children. One such 
opportunity comes from the fact that players generally pay a monthly fee 
to play.180 Paying through a credit card was seemingly in CDA and COPA 
accepted as a proxy for adulthood. Someone who can so pay is old 
enough to have a credit card, or has his or her parents' permission, or will 
be found out when the parents receive the next credit card bill. 
If the number of virtual worlds becomes large and access is without 
cost, or is funded by advertising or product placement, the general In-
ternet problems will likely carry over to this use of the medium. There is, 
however, a constitutional way to limit access by children to Internet sex. 
As argued elsewhere,181 filtering can be accomplished by applying, with 
certain changes to software, the principles of Ginsberg, while avoiding the 
flaw of Butler, to the Internet. The software change is to require all 
software used to place material, web pages, e-mail, postings to bulletin 
boards, etc., to attach a signal to the material that would activate a filter 
parents may obtain to shield their children. The content provider would 
be given the opportunity to toggle off the attachment of the signal, if the 
provider believed the material suitable for children generally or to the 
child to which an e-mail is sent. If material, as defined by the CDA,182 is 
put on the Internet with the filter toggled off and is received by a child, 
the provider would be subject to criminal sanction. Adult-to-adult commu-
nication is unaffected. The only chilling effect is the possibility that some-
one may choose to leave the filter signal attached, even when the material 
would actually be suitable for minors. Even then, however, only access by 
children is limited and then only if the child's parents have chosen to 
employ the filter. 183 
180. See Lastowka & Hunter, Laws, supra note 42, at 8 (discussing platform 
owner income from subscription fees); Noveck, supra note 16, at 1608-09 (discuss-
ing subscription fees and numbers of subscribers). 
181. See KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 164-78 (2003) [hereinafter SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN]; Kevin W. 
Saunders, Electronic Indecency: Protecting Children in the Wake of the Cable and Internet 
Cases, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 42-47 (1997). 
182. For a discussion of the Communications Decency Act, see supra notes 
155-63 and accompanying text. 
183. This suggestion also addresses the problem raised by non-United States 
sites that are not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of America's courts. The solu-
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A potential difficulty in applying this approach to virtual worlds is that 
platform owners may not enjoy quite the same control of content as that 
possessed by web publishers. Web publishers know the content of their 
sites and can make a reasoned decision regarding suitability for children. 
The content of virtual worlds is partially the doing of the platform owner 
but also the result of decisions by other players in that world. While it may 
be possible to require that each player make the decision whether or not 
to make his or her contributions available to any children playing the 
game, there would be gaps in the play that seem more serious than the 
gaps filtering would leave in web pages accessible to children. The interac-
tivity that is the hallmark of play in virtual worlds is gone, where the input 
of some of the players is denied other players. 
If this approach to Internet filtering is to work, the decision on availa-
bility to children would probably have to be left with the platform owners. 
If owners want a more open environment, they may attach the filter-acti-
vating signal and make their world available only to adults (and, of course, 
children whose parents do not employ the filter). If they want the virtual 
world to be available to children, they can take steps to assure the suitabil-
ity of the site. In setting the options for the appearance of avatars, they 
may require that they be clothed, and by not providing avatars with geni-
tals, they can limit sexual activity. They can also employ language filters to 
limit the likelihood of children hearing unsuitable dialog. 
2. Violence 
A concern may also arise over violence in virtual worlds that would 
mirror earlier concerns over violence in comic books,184 film, television 185 
and video games. 186 Allaying this concern does not rest on a First Amend-
ment exception or the more stringent application of that standard when 
children are involved, as sexual material might.187 The concern in those 
other areas was over the possibility that violence in the media may cause 
real-world violence, and that concern may well carry over to the effects of 
tion is to also provide an option on a filter, that parents mayor may not choose to 
enable, that would filter out foreign sites. 
184. See, e.g., INTERIM REpORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMIC BOOKS 
AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, S. REp. No. 62, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
185. For a discussion of violence and television, see infra notes 193-98 and 
accompanying text. 
186. For a discussion of violence and video games, see infra notes 199-209 and 
accompanying text. 
187. I have argued elsewhere that violence should be treated the same as sex, 
that when it is sufficiently graphic and offensive it should be considered obscene 
and especially that it may be obscene for an audience of children. See, e.g., SAUN-
DERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY, supra note 58. This theory was adopted by the fed-
eral district court in upholding an attempt by the city of Indianapolis to limit youth 
access to violent video games in arcades but was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in 
reversing that lower court decision. See Kendrick I, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 
2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001). 
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virtual world violence. This is a potential real-world effect; it is not a con-
cern simply with the well-being of avatars. 
Limiting children's access to virtual worlds depends on the limitations 
passing a strict scrutiny analysis; 188 the restrictions may stand if they are 
necessary to, or narrowly tailored to, a compelling governmental inter-
est. 189 Courts have been willing to accept the physical and psychological 
well-being of youth as a compelling governmental interest,190 but there 
has been difficulty in the necessity or narrow tailoring requirement. 191 
Not only must causation be demonstrated, but the variety of images or 
actions causing the real-world effects must be identified with 
particularity. 192 
There are no studies of the effects of virtual world violence on chil-
dren who play in those worlds, but there is evidence from studies of other 
media that is relevant. There is a great volume of social science documen-
tation examining the effect of violence in television and film. These me-
dia are far less interactive than either video games or play in virtual worlds, 
but the studies are still important. The more active media include the 
reception of images analogously found in the passive media, so the social 
science on the passive media are likely to set a baseline for violent effects; 
that is, whatever effect passive media may have should be present in vio-
lent video games or virtual worlds, and there may perhaps be an enhance-
ment of the effect from active participation. 
188. I argue elsewhere that strict scrutiny should not apply when restrictions 
limit only the expression rights of children or the rights of adults to express them-
selves to other peoples' children. See generally SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN, 
supra note 181. I will proceed with this analysis, however, under the assumption 
that this higher level test must be met. 
189. This has been the approach taken in the video game cases where courts 
went on to examine the validity of the claims. See Kendrick II, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 
2001), em. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. 
Supp. 2d 1051, 1078 (N.D. III. 2005); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzeneg-
ger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1045-46 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Video Software Dealers Ass'n 
v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Interactive Digital!, 200 
F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1135-36 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954,959 (8th Cir. 2003). 
It was also the approach of courts in earlier cases involving videos. See, e.g., Video 
Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684,689 (8th Cir. 1992). 
190. For a list of cases outlining the physical and psychological well-being of 
youth as a compelling governmental interest, see supra note 189. 
191. The Kendrick, Interactive Digital and Blagojevich cases each rejected the em-
pirical evidence as generally inadequate to establish a link between the identified 
concern of first person shooter video games and violence among those who play 
them. See Kendrick II, 244 F.3d at 572; Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1052; Interac-
tive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. The Maleng court seemed more accepting of 
the general evidence but the statute there addressed only games in which the 
player shot law enforcement officers, and the court found no evidence of a special 
danger in those games. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. 
192. The Webster court found the statute at issue lacked narrow tailoring, be-
cause it did not identify the sort of image that was said to cause real world violence. 
968 F.2d at 689. This was less of a problem for the video game cases that focused 
on a particular concern, such as first person shooter games. 
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There is a large body of social science and psychological research on 
violence in film and television corresponding to violence in the real world. 
That research has led the scientific and health communities generally to 
recognize the negative effects of media violence. In a joint statement is-
sued in July 2000, the American Psychological Association, the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry, the American Medical Association, the American Academy of 
Family Physicians and the American Psychiatric Association concluded 
that "well over 1,000 studies ... point overwhelmingly to a causal connec-
tion between media violence and aggressive behavior In some 
children."193 
An earlier policy statement from the American Academy of Pediatrics 
stated that" [t] he vast majority of studies conclude that there is a cause-
and-effect relationship between media violence and real-life violence,"194 
and called the link "undeniable and uncontestable."195 A representative 
of the same pediatrics group also testified before the United States Senate 
Commerce Committee that, of the more than 3,500 studies examining the 
relationship between media and real world violence, "[a]1I but 18 have 
shown a positive correlation between media exposure and violent behav-
ior," and that epidemiological studies lead to the conclusion that "expo-
sure to violent media was a factor in half of the 10,000 homicides 
committed in the United States in the [year studied] ."196 Adding to this 
consensus, the Surgeon General's report entitled Youth Violence, while not-
ing that ethics barred the randomized studies that are best used to deter-
mine causation, concluded that "a diverse body of research provides 
strong evidence that exposure to violence in the media can increase chil-
dren's aggressive behavior in the short run."197 Although less secure in 
asserting a causal connection to long-term violence, the report does find a 
"small but statistically significant impact on aggression over many 
years."198 
These conclusions are based on research on the passive media, but it 
seems likely that the same conclusions would result from research on 
video games. The more active involvement of those games would seem 
likely to enhance violence or aggression-inducing effects. At any rate, the 
193. American Academy of Pediatrics, Joint Statement on the Impact of Entertain-
ment Violence on Children: Congressional Public Health Summit 1 Guly 26, 2000), availa-
ble at www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.htm. 
194. Committee on Communications, Media Violence, 95 Pediatrics 949 
(1995), available at www.aap.org/policy/00830.htm!. 
195. [d. 
196. On Media Violence: Hearing Before the S. Commerce Comm., 105th Congo 
(2002) (statement of Donald E. Cook, M.D., President of Am. Ass'n of Pediatrics), 
available at www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/medvioltest.htm. 
197. REpORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, YOUTH VIOLENCE: SUMMARY OF MAJOR 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS (2001) (App'x 4B), available at www.surgeongenera!. 
gOY /library /youthviolence/ chapter4/ appendix4bsec3.h tm!. 
198. [d. 
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video game player is also a viewer and, at a minimum, whatever effect vio-
lence has on viewers would carry over to video games, with the additional 
possibility that the more actively involved player will face an enhanced 
effect. 
While the more recent advent of video games, especially those with 
extreme violence set in a rich graphics environment, has not provided as 
long a period for research to develop to the same degree, there is a grow-
ing body of research demonstrating that video games raise similar or 
greater concerns than those raised by passive media studies. A study by 
Professors Craig Anderson and Karen Dill included a combination of cor-
relational/demographic data and a laboratory experiment to examine the 
effects of violent video games. 199 Anderson and Dill concluded that the 
combination of the results from these two different study varieties sup-
ported the conclusion that playing violent video games causes real world 
violence.2oo They also argued that violent video games are a greater con-
cern than violent television or films because of player identification with 
the game's aggressor and active participation in the violence. "In a sense, 
violent video games provide a complete learning environment for aggres-
sion, with simultaneous exposure to modeling, reinforcement, and re-
hearsal of behaviors. This combination of learning strategies has been 
shown to be more powerful than any of those methods used singly."201 
A 2001 meta-analysis of the research on violent video games and real-
world violence led Professor Anderson and Professor Brad Bushman to 
conclude that "[v]iolent video games increased aggression in males and 
females, in children and adults, in experimental and nonexperimental set-
tings."202 Experimental studies in laboratory settings showed that "short 
term exposure to violent video games causes at least a temporary increase 
in aggression,"203 and demographic studies showed that "exposure to vio-
lent video games is correlated with aggression in the real world."204 A 
more recent update of the meta-analysis presented three conclusions the 
author found important: 
First, as more studies of violent video games have been con-
ducted, the significance of violent video game effects on key ag-
gression and helping-related variables has become clearer. 
199. See generally Anderson & Dill, supra note 78. The studies are also dis-
cussed in Saunders, Restricting Access, supra note 45, at 72-74. 
200. Anderson & Dill, supra note 78, at 787 ("The convergence of findings 
across such disparate methods lends considerable support to the main hypothesis 
that exposure to violent video games can increase aggressive behavior."). 
201. Id. at 788 (citations omitted). 
202. Craig A. Anderson & Brad J. Bushman, Effects of Violent Video Games on 
Aggressive Behavior, Aggressive Cognition, Aggressive Affect, Psychological Arousal, and 
Prosocial Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Scientific Literature, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
353, 357 (2001). 
203. Id. (emphasis added). 
204. Id. 
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Second, the claim (or worry) that poor methodological charac-
teristics of some studies has led to a false, inflated conclusion 
about violent video game effects is simply wrong. Third, video 
game studies with better methods typically yield bigger effects, 
suggesting that heightened concern about the deleterious effects 
of exposure to violent video games is warranted.205 
225 
The conclusions regarding violence in the passive media carry over to, and 
may be greater for, the active medium of violent video games. 
It might be argued that the only thing the experiments demonstrate 
is correlation, rather than causation. While all that can ever be directly 
observed is correlation, and causation is always an inference from correla-
tion, constancy makes for confidence in that inference. Correlation in 
social science is generally less than constant, so causation may seem less 
assured. A lack of constancy, however, does not preclude an inference of 
causation in many areas including, for example, first hand or second hand 
smoke and lung cancer, lead exposure and cognitive effects, calcium in-
take and bone mass, and a number of other common scientific conclu-
sions. Indeed, the correlation in all these cases, except that of first hand 
smoke and lung cancer, is less than that for media violence and real world 
aggression.206 
Reluctance to accept causation in the media violence case, while ac-
cepting it in others, may occur because of a perceived lack of physical 
chain of cause and effect. Smoke irritates the lungs and makes the infer-
ence that it causes cancer explainable, while an "irritation" of the mind 
lacks a physical explication. Recent work in neuroscience, however, indi-
cates how this sort of psychological causation could work.207 
Previously, the scientific community thought that the brain com-
pleted physical development in early childhood, but that turns out to be 
true only of the brain's cognitive regions. Babies, at birth, have as many 
synaptic connections between the nerve cells in the cognitive regions as 
adults, and the connections increase in the first two years to a level that is 
fifty percent greater than adults. At a point in the second year, as the 
child develops a basic understanding and construction of the world, this 
over-blooming of synapses is pared to the adult level. Recently it has been 
shown that there is a parallel in over-blooming of synapses during puberty 
in the prefrontal cortex, the brain's center for judgment and inhibition. 
In the teen years, there is a paring similar to that of late infancy, and the 
synapses that survive, in both cases, are those that are reinforced through 
205. Craig A. Anderson, An Update on the Effects of Playing Violent Video Games, 
27 J. OF ADOLESCENCE 113, 120 (2004). 
206. See Anderson & Bushman, supra note 202, at 481 (noting effect of violent 
video games on aggression is comparable to effect of condom use on risk of HIV 
infection) . 
207. For a general presentation of the recent science, see BARBARA STRAUCH, 
THE PRIMAL TEEN: WHAT THE NEW DISCOVERIES ABOUT THE TEENAGE BRAIN TELL Us 
ABOUT OUR KIDS (2003). 
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interaction with the environment.208 It then becomes clearer, at least as 
clear as the cellular effects of tobacco smoke, how a heavily violent envi-
ronment, even a virtual one, may have an effect on what synapses remain 
active to be used in exercising future judgment. While courts remain un-
convinced by the evidence of a causal link between violent video games 
and aggressive behavior,209 it is important to note that each time a litigant 
asserts the danger of violent video games, the science must be examined 
anew to determine its current state. 
Returning to virtual worlds, any negative impact from the content the 
player experiences should be at least as great as that from the passive me-
dia. Playing involves, at a minimum, watching what occurs on the monitor 
and listening to any accompanying sound. To the degree that film and 
television negatively impact on the physical and psychological health of 
minors, for example through the causation of real world violence, virtual 
worlds should have at least that impact. The additional impact argued to 
exist in video games may well also be present for virtual worlds. The 
player participates actively and identifies particularly with one of the char-
acters, the player's avatar. That identification heightens media impact. 
If sufficient danger exists in a particular virtual world, the same issues 
over regulatory means remain. Again, if the platform owner established a 
game that is thoroughly infused with violence and is unacceptable in the 
danger posed to youth, the platform owner might be required to add the 
filter activating signal already discussed.210 On the other hand, when the 
violence comes from the actions of other players, those players may be 
incapable of adding a filtering signal. The best approach may be for the 
platform owner to make the decision on acceptability for children based 
on the capabilities built into the game. If a game is designed to allow for 
extreme violence among avatars, particularly any game that combines a 
208. See, e.g., Peter R. Huttenlocher & Arun S. Dabholkar, Regional Differences 
in Synaptogenesis in Human Cerebral Cortex, 387 J. COMPo NEUROLOGY 167, 17&-77 
(1997) ("Stabilization of randomly made synapses appears to be activity depen-
dent. Synaptic contacts that are not included in neuronal circuits are gradually 
eliminated .... Synapse elimination, in contrast to synaptogenesis, seems to be at 
least to some extent environmentally regulated."). 
209. See Kendrick II, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001), cm. denied, 534 U.S. 994 
(2001) (concluding that studies of violent video games do not prove they are more 
harmful than other violent forms of entertainment); Entm't Software Ass'n v. 
Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (concluding that research 
has not established solid causal link between violent video games and aggressive 
behavior); Video Software Dealers Ass'n V. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 
1046 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (indicating agreement with court's conclusion in 
Blagojroich); Video Software Dealers Ass'n V. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1188 
(W.D. Wash. 2004) (concluding current state of research does not support causal 
link between exposure to violent video games and actual violence); Interactive Digi-
tal II, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rro'd, 329 F.3d 954, 958-59 (8th Cir. 
2003) (rejecting evidence that violent video games lead to more aggressive 
behavior). 
210. For a further discussion of the filter activating signal, see supra notes 181-
83 and accompanying text. 
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virtual world with first person shooter capability, the owner might be re-
quired to attach the filter activating signal. 211 
III. INTERESTS BEYOND PARTICIPATION 
A. Property Rights in Virtual Worlds 
Players in virtual worlds may accumulate property in those worlds; in-
deed, progress in the game may be measured by the accumulation of 
goods and virtual "real" property.212 In The Sims Online, a player may 
purchase land, buy walls and a roof for a house, furnish the house, and 
put in a pool, or a player may buy an already completed home.213 The 
possibility of purchasing these virtual assets implies that there is someone 
to provide them. That someone could be the platform owner, who would 
provide them as a reward for reaching certain levels, just as free games 
were provided in pinball games and an extra life in PacMan or a variety of 
other video games. The assets might also be made available for sale by 
other players. In that case, there must be rules of the game that allow the 
transfer of property, and for that possibility to have any significance, play-
ers must have rights to their assets, at least within the context of the 
game.214 
Property disputes could certainly arise within the game. A player 
might put in considerable time to build a virtual luxury house with the 
intent of selling it at a profit in game currency in order to acquire some 
other assets. The owner of a neighboring property may develop or use 
that property in a way that diminishes the value of the speculator's house. 
That could lead to a nuisance suit or the demand for zoning, and if zoning 
is put in place, the owners of undeveloped properties may argue that the 
zoning diminished the value of their property. These issues seem to de-
211. Some games, like Everquest, do not provide the possibility of virtual homi-
cide while others allow players to choose a server that permits killing. See Bradley 
& Froomkin, supra note 32, at 128-29 (explaining limitations and options for in-
cluding/excluding killing in some virtual games). 
212. See Lastowka & Hunter, Laws, supra note 42, at 29-51 (providing general 
overview of property in virtual worlds). 
213. See id. at 30 (discussing some options in building or purchasing virtual 
home in The Sims Online). The currency necessary to purchase assets in The Sims 
Online, simoleans, may be amassed by having other players visit you, which requires 
the player to be online more regularly to have his or her house open or to have 
roommates to share the efforts at hospitality. See id. at 31. 
214. If assets simply disappear or are taken away randomly, any effort to accu-
mulate property would not seem to be worthwhile. Of course, if there are predict-
able ways in which property is lost or even an expected degree of randomness, the 
loss becomes part of the game. This would seem to be an opportunity for virtual 
insurance agents. If the rules allow for property to be taken by force, again that 
becomes part of the game and might be prevented through the accumulation of 
sufficient force on the part of the virtual property owner. The game loses its ap-
peal when property, even when accumulated through effort, is nothing more than 
some fleeting possession in which the "owner" has no more expectation of posses-
sion than any other player. 
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mand legal resolution, but as earlier suggested, these issues should not be 
the subject matter of suit in real world courts.215 
There are real world, at least hypothetical, analogies that also suggest 
that real world courts should avoid these issues. Suppose you play in an 
amateur basketball league and have a great outside shot. The league has 
had a three point rule for longer distance shots that adds to your total 
scoring, your enjoyment of the game and your team's likelihood of win-
ning. The league, for some reason (having to include a gym without the 
three point circle, finding they can provide only one official per game 
whom they want to concentrate on other issues, etc.) decides to eliminate 
the three point shot. You enjoy it less, your scoring drops and your team 
does not make the playoffs. Yet, you should not be able to take this inter-
nal to the game dispute to an external court. In the same way, a player in 
a virtual world should have to live with the rules of the game, even if those 
rules change. 
Consider another example. Suppose that an American League base-
ball team, before the adoption of the designated hitter, spent a great deal 
of money to acquire a pitching staff of players who were both good pitch-
ers and good hitters. The hitting ability of those pitchers would have in-
creased the acquisition price. Once the league adopted the designated 
hitter rule, the value of the pitchers on the staff dropped.216 Yet, it seems 
unlikely that baseball team owners would be allowed to argue outside the 
game before a real world court. The dispute is internal to the game and 
needs to be resolved through baseball's own rulemaking and adjudication 
mechanisms. A real world court should not decide what the best rules are 
for baseball. If, on the other hand, the dispute is over the agreement the 
owners of baseball teams adopted in forming a league, then that is a real 
world agreement and should be subject to real world court adjudication. 
Thus, if some original agreement made the rules sacrosanct and not sub-
ject to later change by the Commissioner or owners, an owner negatively 
affected as suggested should have recourse to the real world courts. 
The baseball example may seem an inapt analogy in that it implicated 
real world assets-the money in dollars expended in purchasing the pitch-
ers-while the disputes suggested in the virtual world are purely game-
related. That does not destroy the analogy, however, because it should be 
an even stronger argument; that is, if a rule change in baseball may not be 
contested in real world courts despite the real money involved, then dis-
putes in virtual world, where virtual money is involved, should be even less 
suitable fodder for real world courts. 
215. For a discussion of the utility of real world courts in settling virtual world 
disputes, see supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text and infra notes 215-39 and 
accompanying text. 
216. While the club owner might try to trade the pitchers to National League 
clubs, the teams on the demand side of the supply-demand equation have been cut 
in half, so the value should still drop. 
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An even more interesting response is that the dispute in the virtual 
world may, in fact, impact financial interests in the real world. There is an 
interaction between real world and virtual world economies that is surpris-
ing to non-players. Assets in virtual worlds are not simply traded or 
bought and sold using the currencies of the virtual worlds. They are 
bought and sold using real world currency. 
Foreign exchanges in currency and direct investment operate 
constantly between the virtual worlds or Britannia, Rubi-Ka, Blaz-
ing Falls, and Norrath, on the one hand, and real-world bank 
accounts in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Korea on 
the other. The mechanisms of it are simple. Possessing some 
valuable asset in the virtual world ... , I list it for sale in the sec-
tion of eBay devoted to such auctions. The auction winner uses 
eBay payment mechanisms ... to transfer the agreed price in the 
real world. I then agree with the auction winner on a meeting 
place in the virtual world, and when we meet there I hand over 
the in-world property.217 
Indeed, a search of eBay's Internet Games section for "Blazing Falls," 
the town in The Sims Online, turns up property ranging from real estate to 
exotic animals to more common pets, all virtual, for sale for real world 
dollars. 
Perhaps more interestingly, a search of the eBay Internet Games sec-
tion for "simoleans," the currency of Blazing Falls, yields hundreds of of-
ferings. Thus, garners who do not want to take the time to build up 
currency by playing the game can use income from a real world job to 
advance their virtual world income. With such an active market, exchange 
rates may develop between the real world and virtual world markets. Us-
ing a market exchange rate between the currency of the virtual world of 
Norrath and the real world, it has been estimated that the economy of 
Norrath is larger than that of Bulgaria and that the effective hourly wage 
for playing in Norrath and accumulating capital convertible to dollars is 
$3.42 per hour, higher than many third world wage scales.218 
This disparity between the worth of work in virtual worlds compared 
to the third world led one group of "entrepreneurs" to hire real world 
workers to toil in virtual world mines to produce real world assets. An 
entity named Blacksnow Interactive reportedly set up a sweatshop in Ti-
juana in which Mexican laborers, rather than making shirts or auto parts, 
spent their days sitting at computer screens using a mouse to point and 
click in ways that accumulated assets. Blacksnow then sold the assets for 
real world currency.219 The platform owner for the game in which the 
217. Lastowka & Hunter, Laws, supra note 42, at 38 (footnotes omitted). 
218. See id. at 39 (citing economic studies contained in Castronova, Virtual 
Worlds, supra note 19, at 33). 
219. See id. (explaining history of Blacksnow). 
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laborers toiled eventually cracked down on the operation, and Blacksnow 
sued the owner.220 While the suit was later dropped, this indicates how 
actions seemingly limited to a computer game can have real world mone-
tary consequences and can potentially lead to civil actions in real world 
courts. 
The Blacksnow situation illustrates that a game can become more 
than just a game and suggests real world courts may encounter difficulty in 
avoiding cases arising in virtual worlds. There are clearly some cases 
where an exchange involving a virtual world asset merits consideration by 
a real world court. Consider a case in which a person purports to offer a 
"Blazing Falls" asset for sale on eBay. A player of The Sims Online offers the 
top bid and is named the auction winner. The buyer agrees to send pay-
ment to the seller and does so in a way that cannot be cancelled.221 The 
buyer and seller agree to have their avatars meet at some location in the 
virtual world to transfer the asset, but instead, the seller's avatar never 
shows up, may not actually own the asset or the seller may not even play in 
that world. Here a cause of action by the buyer should be available. Note 
though that the real issue here is not the ownership of property in the 
virtual world. The issue is fraud in the real world, and the remedy should 
be in the real world. The case is really no different from any action over a 
failure to perform an act for which there is a contractual obligation. The 
act is virtual, but if a singer's failure to perform at an event is actionable, 
failure to show up and turn over the virtual asset would seem to merit 
similar treatment. In both cases the hallmark of the action is payment for 
the service in real world currency followed by the failure to perform.222 
The more interesting cases occur when the purchased asset is handed 
over in the virtual world, but something happens to reduce the value of 
the asset. Such a case is similar to the Blacksnow example. The player 
amassed assets, either through working in the virtual world or by purchas-
ing them in the real world and receiving them in the virtual world, and the 
platform owner then does something that lessens the value of the assets. 
While this may again be part of the game, in that the platform owner-
through the end user license agreement-may have the right to make the 
change, it may be argued not only to affect the play of the game, but also 
to have a real world effect on the saleable value of assets held in the virtual 
220. See id. (describing backdrop to Blacksnow civil suit). 
221. While this may be unwise, it could happen. eBay sellers and buyers accu-
mulate feedback from transactions with each other. A smart purchaser would only 
send a certified check to someone with a good bit of positive feedback. Thus un-
scrupulous sellers will not last long before their feedback limits their sales. They 
may change their screen names, but then they operate with no feedback, diminish-
ing the likelihood of someone sending cash or a certified check. 
222. Misrepresentation of the asset would seem to merit similar treatment. 
Again the action is based on the payment of real world currency induced by real 
world statements about the characteristic of an asset. The fact that the asset is a 
virtual world asset should not change the fundamental nature of the cause of 
action. 
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world. Consequently, the virtual world holder of the assets brings suit 
against the platform owner. 
Again, a real world example may cast some light on the amenability of 
the dispute to court action. Suppose the United States Post Office pro-
duces a stamp with a misprint, such as an air mail stamp with a plane 
printed upside down. That stamp quickly becomes a collector's item and 
its price in the hands of private owners soars. Suppose further that the 
Post Office, in an effort to stem what it sees as undesirable speculation 
based on its errors, tries to eliminate the stamp's value. It may not be able 
to recall all its stamp sales once the stamp is in private hands. It can cer-
tainly recall those that haven't been sold, but that would just increase the 
value of those stamps already in private hands. The most effective strategy 
might well be to print thousands of stamps with the same image. Flooding 
the market will reduce the value of the stamps already printed and will 
have the further effect of dampening the market for any future misprints, 
which would be presumed by collectors to likely suffer the same treatment. 
If a collector paid what now seems an inflated price, should there be a 
cause of action against the Post Office? If the Post Office violated some 
real world rules regarding the issuance of stamps, then perhaps yes. But, if 
the only "violation" is the failure to follow an assumed practice in what 
might be thought of as the virtual world Philatelist, then an action against 
the Post Office would seem unfounded. So too in the online virtual 
worlds. A violation of the end user licensing agreement, like a violation of 
the Post Office's own rules, might be a basis for real world court action. A 
simple "violation" of the player's assumptions should merit no hearing in 
the real world's courts. 
Another issue may arise where a player purchased an asset in the real 
world and transferred it in the virtual world, but the seller knows how, 
within the context of the game, to reclaim the asset or does something 
within the rules of the game to devalue the asset. If there was fraud in the 
original, real world dealings-for example, claims about the stability and 
permanence of the asset-again there may be real world litigation. But. 
absent such fraud, the situation is similar to a virtual world encounter with 
no real world dealing-for example, a situation in which one avatar simply 
converts the virtual world property of another avatar. If that does not con-
stitute real world theft, there should be no real world legal proceedings, 
and the issue should be left to resolution within the confines of the game. 
There are those who reject this distinction between real world and 
virtual world crime and would presumably allow a real world conversion 
action or even a criminal charge, based on the virtual world theft of virtual 
property. Professors Lastowka and Hunter apply a number of philosophi-
cal theories of property to virtual property and conclude that the reasons 
for recognizing property rights in the real world apply with equal vigor to 
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property rights in virtual worlds.223 If these rights have equal status, then 
it would seem that the law should recognize and enforce virtual property 
rights. Indeed, Professor Castronova notes that the Korean government 
prosecuted people who hacked into games and punished offenders more 
harshly when the person destroyed or transferred valuable game items.224 
One last argument for protecting rights in virtual property should be 
addressed. Society's willingness to protect property is at least a major part 
of what gives property value. If property owners cannot be confident that 
their rights to that property will be recognized and enforced by society, 
the value attached to that property and the willingness to acquire or de-
velop the property will decrease. But for this argument to dictate action, it 
must be determined whether the development and acquisition of property 
in a virtual world is a societal good. 
Development of virtual property does make for a richer virtual world. 
That would seem to be good for the inhabitants (players) in the virtual 
world, and it would be good for the platform owner, who should then be 
able to attract more players. Thus, there may be some incentive for the 
virtual world itself, through the players or the platform owners, to protect 
property interests. That is, of course, only true if a world richer in prop-
erty is the goal. If the players or owners want a virtual world in which 
"property" is treated more like goods in a state of nature, or a communist 
society for that matter, there will be no recognition of property rights. 
Turning to the real world, it may be argued that there is not sufficient 
reason to protect virtual property. Yochai Benkler argued that the real 
answer to the question of who owned a virtual spoon is: There is no spoon. 225 
It is true that there is no spoon, but there is computer code that causes 
there to appear to be a spoon. The code is in the real world, and intellec-
tual property law protecting that code should be recognized in the same 
way intellectual property law may recognize rights to code in other situa-
tions, but the spoon is only in the virtual world. Intellectual property law 
may be justified by its role in making the real world richer by providing 
protection, and incentive, for the labor of creativity; however, the interest 
in protecting the product of that code in a virtual world is a different, and 
may be a weaker, interest. It may be the difference in society's protection 
against copying the text of a novel and society's concern about the inter-
nal workings of the novel. We protect novels because the world is a better 
223. See Lastowka & Hunter, Laws, supra note 42, at 43-50 (applying property 
theories to virtual property). 
224. See Castronova, Right to Play, supra note 28, at 191 (discussing Korean 
government's response to theft or destruction of virtual property). Professor Cas-
tronova also makes the interesting point that, if virtual assets are seen as having 
sufficient value as to merit real world protection, real world governments may also 
see reason to tax them. See id. at 195-96. 
225. See Yochai Benkler, There Is No Spoon 1, available at www.yale.edu/law-
web/ jbalkin/telecom/yochaibenkerthereisnospoon.pdf. Benkler's example is a 
dispute between a virtual world provider and a user, but the answer may nonethe-
less be correct independent of the disputants. 
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place with novels. While the world might in some sense be better with 
particular plot twists in a novel, society does nothing to require or prohibit 
story lines.226 
Once again, the suggestion is that real world courts should be limited 
to real world issues. If code is appropriated, that code is in the real world, 
and intellectual property law should apply. If the function of the code is 
to cause a spoon to appear and be useable in a virtual world, what happens 
in that world should be outside the interest of real world courts. If, within 
the functioning of the platform, the spoon may be stolen in the virtual 
world, any remedy should be a virtual world remedy. If, on the other 
hand, the appropriation of the spoon occurs through hacking into the 
platform server, that should be treated the same as any other real world 
hacking into a server. The injury is not really to the property interest in a 
virtual spoon, it is to the property interest in the security of the server. 
This answer may be seen as less than certain. Maybe the real world 
would be a better place with virtual world property protected than it would 
be with no such protection for virtual property. All the argument shows is 
that the willingness to protect real world property, to the degree that it is 
based on improving the real world, does not necessarily carry over to the 
protection of virtual property. Whatever gain may come from the protec-
tion of virtual world property must be balanced against the real world ef-
forts and costs associated with that protection. I am simply suggesting that 
the balance should be struck in favor of letting virtual worlds protect their 
own property and leave real courts to the protection of real world prop-
erty, including real world appropriation of code. 
B. Virtual World Crime 
Professors Lastowka and Hunter, in another one of their insightful 
pieces on virtual worlds, examined the application of criminal law to 
events in and touching on virtual worlds.227 They come to a conclusion 
similar to that which I would accept, while perhaps treating the possibility 
of criminal actions for purely in-game activity more seriously than I would. 
They focus on the appropriation or destruction of virtual property and 
conclude that these acts generally should not lead to criminal liability, but 
that where there is exploitation of the game's software for financial gain, 
there may be room for criminal liability.228 
226. While society may choose to prohibit obscene material and the First 
Amendment allows that limitation on expression, Kingsley International Pictures v. 
Regents of the University of the State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), demonstrates 
that the story line cannot be the basis for a ban. Id. at 695 (finding unconstitu-
tional prohibition on films portraying acts of sexual immorality as "desirable, ac-
ceptable or proper patterns of behavior"). 
227. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REv. 293 (2004) [hereinafter Lastowka & Hunter, Virtual Crimes] (examining crimi-
nal law as applied to virtual world). 
228. See id. at 294 (summarizing article's conclusion). 
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As a basis for discussion of the issue, Lastowka and Hunter use a situa-
tion that arose in Ultima Online's world Britannia.229 A person playing the 
game managed to make off with a "Bone Crusher mace," seemingly a valu-
able asset within the game. Another person then offered to purchase the 
mace for real world money and the "thief' agreed. The question 
presented is then whether the "thief' is guilty of the real crime of selling 
stolen property. This is a subtly different and more interesting question 
than whether or not the original "theft" is subject to criminal liability. The 
original appropriation was entirely within the virtual world, and applica-
tion of the machinery of real world criminal prosecution is more easily 
rejected. By addressing the sale there becomes a real world issue whether 
the mace is stolen property. I would still argue that it is not stolen prop-
erty in any real world sense because, as Lastowka and Hunter agree, the 
Bone Crusher mace is not a real mace. 230 In a sense, there is no property 
to have been stolen. There is again code, but there is no suggestion of a 
violation of intellectual property law, no stealing of code and subsequent 
sale. 
Lastowka and Hunter suggest that the best defense to the charge of 
selling stolen goods is not that there was no property to be stolen, but that 
within the rules of Ultima Online, Bone Crusher maces are made to be 
stolen. That is, the rules of the game allow this virtual theft, and just as no 
one would consider criminal liability for the defense stealing the ball in a 
basketball game, we should not consider the appropriation of the mace a 
real criminal act. As they explain: "The norms of game play supersede the 
standard rules of society, and the magic circle will only be broken if a 
player violates the game rules. A violation of game rules will result in a 
stoppage of play and a penalty of some sort .... "231 The conclusion 
seems to be that, if the rules allow theft, then theft should not be ad-
dressed outside of the game. 
The most interesting cases for the imposition of out-of-game penalties 
in other contexts is the case where a physical injury to a player results. 
There are cases in which players are injured, without any violation of the 
rules. A football player may suffer an injured knee from a perfectly legal 
tackle. Certainly, there should not be any out-of-game penalty imposed 
for legal play. There are also fouls that should not lead to criminal sanc-
tions. If a soccer player tackles an opponent about to break away for a 
goal scoring opportunity, that is a foul sometimes known as a professional 
foul. It is against the rules but, if outside the penalty area, results only in 
the other team having an opportunity to put the ball in play with a free 
kick. The foul is considered a part of the game, and given that expecta-
tion, no outside penalties would be reasonable. 
229. See id. at 299-300 (discussing situation in Ultima Online where player 
traded virtual currency and chattels for U.S. dollars). 
230. See id. at 302-03 (analyzing theft of virtual mace). 
231. Id. at 305 (footnotes omitted). 
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Lastowka and Hunter seem to get beyond the rules of the game limi-
tations on criminality and address the issue of acts that are not within the 
rules but are accepted or contemplated. 
If stealing Bone Crusher maces is indeed a permissible activity 
pursuant to both the software and the contractual provisions in 
Ultima Online, it would seem that the theft of a Bone Crusher 
mace could not possibly constitute an unlawful conversion. Like-
wise, even though there is no common law doctrine that exempts 
in-game property thefts from the scope of criminal law, it seems 
highly unlikely that virtual property "crimes" which are entirely 
consistent with software and contractual game rules would be 
criminally prosecuted.232 
If the requirement for non-prosecutability is that the "theft" be within the 
rules of the game, I would view that as too strong. If the theft is possible 
completely within the games and did not involve any real world fraud,233 
there should be no criminal action. 
Lastowska and Hunter do point to an interesting case in which the 
Supreme Court was willing to look at the rules of a game. In PGA Tour, 
Inc. v. Martin,234 the Supreme Court considered whether the rules of pro-
fessional golf that prohibit golf carts were a violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, when applied to a golfer with motor difficulties.235 
Lastowska and Hunter found some suggestion in that case that courts 
might impose real world rules on game play, even for virtual worlds. 
There is some theoretical potential for the legal recognition of 
player entitlement to virtual property and to the legal prohibi-
tion of virtual property crimes . . . . [T] he PGA was essentially a 
game owner and it had expressly promulgated the rules of a com-
petition that forbid Casey Martin to use a golf cart. Yet, the Su-
preme Court did not defer to the PGA's rules of golf when they 
conflicted with the needs of a disabled player. 236 
It is true that the Court examined the rules of golf to determine the 
essentialness of the requirement that players walk, because that essential-
ness is a factor in applying the statute. The key here though is that the 
legal claim was that a real person was being discriminated against, and that 
discrimination is illegal unless an accommodation would change the es-
sential nature of the game of professional golf. The real lesson to be 
drawn here is that, as with golf, the law should apply to platform owners 
who somehow discriminate against those who would like to play the game. 
232. !d. at 310 (footnotes omitted). 
233. For a discussion of virtual world fraud, see supra notes 221-22 and accom-
panying text. 
234. 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
235. See id. at 664 (describing issues presented in case). 
236. Lastowka & Hunter, Virtual Crimes, supra note 227, at 310-11. 
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But that does not mean that a real world court should consider a claim 
that a world in which some variety of avatar, as opposed to some class of 
player, suffers a disability violates the law of the United States.237 
There are other cases in which outside penalties seem justified. 
These cases result not just from a garden variety violation of the rules or 
even an intentional professional foul. Somewhere between a hockey 
player interfering with an opponent about to receive a pass and break 
away on goal and a player hitting another in the head with a hard swing of 
a hockey stick, some line must be drawn. Drawing that line may be diffi-
cult,238 but one limitation would seem clear: without physical injury, or an 
attempt to cause serious injury, to a real person, real world criminal penal-
ties are unjustified. A rape that occurs in the real world is essentially dif-
ferent from a rape that occurs in LambdaMOO.239 And, if the killing of 
an avatar were to constitute real world criminality, efforts to prevent chil-
dren from playing violent video games would have met with far more suc-
cess than they thus far have. 
C. The Rights of Avatars 
Raph Koster, in 2000, wrote A Declaration of the Rights of Avatars,24o 
drawing guidance from the Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. He asserted that "[a]vatars are cre-
ated free and equal in rights," that avatars have, among other rights, "the 
right to be treated as people and not as disembodied, meaningless, soul-
less puppets ... [with rights to] liberty, property, security, and resistance 
to oppression."241 Koster included comments from those to whom the 
declaration was first sent. The most telling is: "Rights of avatars? Why not 
of 'chess pieces'? Maybe the players have rights, but avatars are just repre-
sentations."242 That pretty much sums up the conceptual difficulty in as-
signing rights to avatars. There is nothing to an avatar other than code or 
magnetic memory in a server. There is nothing that would be considered 
237. For a discussion of virtual worlds as places of public accommodation, see 
infra notes 24M 7 and accompanying text. 
238. See Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, The Problem of Sports Violence and the 
Criminal Prosecution Solution, 12 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'y 145,146 (2002) (noting 
that "society remains unable to find a way to effectively extricate unnecessary vio-
lence from ... sports"). 
239. But see Castronova, Right to Play, supra note 28, at 192 ("[T]he victims 
seem to have truly suffered. Who then is to say that there is a difference between 
real rape and synthetic rape?") (footnotes omitted). 
240. Raph Koster, A Declaration of the Rights of Avatars, http://www.raphkoster. 
com/gaming/playerrights.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. (explaining administrator's comments on original declaration of ava-
tar rights). 
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a person capable of holding whatever rights might be recognized for such 
en ti ties. 243 
The refusal to multiply entities may clear up any confusion underly-
ing the issue of what rights may obtain in the context of virtual worlds. 
For example, as far as freedom of speech may be enforced by real world 
courts, it is as a right of the players, rather than of avatars. As indicated 
earlier, players' freedom of expression has force against government inter-
ference. 244 Players may also assert a freedom of expression against inter-
ference by platform owners, but this will be a matter of the contract 
between player and owner.245 Where the assertion becomes almost meta-
phorical is in the assertion that the avatars themselves have expression 
rights against the wizards of the platform owner. Again, there is nothing 
there as a repository of rights. 
Koster's assertion that avatars are equal seems an assertion of rights 
like those guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. Here, too, if the 
real world governments of the states treat real people who wish to play in 
virtual worlds differently, there are equal protection implications. A more 
likely application of law would be in the case of a platform owner who 
decided to treat people wishing to play differently. Assuming that plat-
forms could be argued to be a public accommodation, various statutes bar-
ring discrimination could apply.246 It seems likely that a platform owner 
who decided that certain racial or ethnic minorities would not be allowed 
to participate, or did the same on the basis of sex, would run afoul of 
federal or state antidiscrimination statutes. If, on the other hand, the 
game treated certain types of avatars differently, then that would seem an 
inapt subject for real world courts. If a game allowed players to experi-
ence virtually the Civil Rights era in the American South, those whose ava-
tars were Mrican-American would not have a real world court action 
contesting the refusal of virtual world registrars of voters to register them. 
Similar analysis should apply to discrimination on the basis of handi-
cap. Perhaps platform owners might be required to accommodate those 
real world players who wish to participate in the virtual world. But, that 
would be due to the Americans with Disabilities Act's247 application to a 
243. Although mental states may be thought of as electro-chemical states and 
persons may be nothing but a collection of strings, which are themselves nothing 
but energy, we still do not consider all electro-magnetic states as persons. 
Whatever it may take to be considered a person, my microwave is not included. 
244. For a discussion of players' freedom of expression, see supra notes 45-78 
and accompanying text. 
245. For a discussion of this contract matter, see supra notes 81-125 and ac-
companying text. 
246. If the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the Boy Scouts could be held 
by state courts to be places of public accommodation for purposes of antidis-
crimination laws, the idea of a platform containing a virtual world being similarly 
treated does not seem too far fetched. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2006). 
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real world situation. That is a far different situation from an internal 
claim to be free from discrimination on the basis of, or a demand for 
accommodation to address, the disability of an avatar. If an avatar has 
certain disabilities, perhaps ones that may be overcome or cured through 
play of the game and the attainment of powers, it seems odd to assert that 
other avatars are not allowed to discriminate against and must provide 
accommodation to the disabled avatar. 
There is an interesting response to player complaints over the rules in 
a virtual world. In real world political theory, consent is an important is-
sue. If those subject to the laws of a jurisdiction can be said to have con-
sented to be governed in the manner used in that jurisdiction, the laws 
gain legitimacy, and refusal to adhere to the law may be seen as illegiti-
mate. In the real world, consent may be difficult to establish. In most or 
all societies, finding an actual consent by the citizens is problematic. Most 
people are simply born into a state and cannot be said to have consented 
to anything. The naturalized citizen has had a moment of consent and the 
player in virtual worlds may be seen as making the same commitment. 
The naturalized citizen's oath may find its equivalent in the player's ac-
cepting the end user licensing agreement. Both are moments at which 
there is agreement to be bound by the laws or rules of real world states or 
virtual world regimes. 
There can also be arguments for consent of those who were born into 
a real world state.248 By accepting the benefits of the society, one may be 
argued to be bound by the laws of that society. By failing to leave the 
country in which one found himself or herself born, one might be argued 
to have tacitly consented to be governed by the laws and political process 
of that country. These arguments are not compelling, however. It may be 
difficult to avoid accepting the benefits of society. Indeed, accepting ben-
efits such as education may be mandatory. It is also difficult to leave the 
country of one's birth, and remaining may not legitimately be taken to 
constitute tacit consent. Leaving would require disengagement with one's 
family and friends. It also requires a country that will accept the emigrant 
and allow him or her to earn a living. 
Tacit consent, in addition to the explicit consent already discussed, 
may be more easily established for players in virtual worlds. One does not, 
speaking from the point of view of the player rather than the avatar, sim-
ply find oneself born into a world. Rather the player choses to participate 
in the virtual world. If it was not a wise choice, the player can terminate 
play in that world and move to another virtual world. It is true that, after 
playing some time in one world, a player may have amassed assets or pow-
ers that would be lost in leaving that world, so a parallel might be seen to 
the difficulties in leaving a country in the real world. For example, the 
player might lose contact with other player's avatars that remain in the 
248. For a discussion of the difficulty of establishing such tacit consent, see 
PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAw 65-67 (1984). 
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original world. There are, however, differences. Finding another plat-
form owner willing to accept your monthly subscription fee is certain to be 
easier than finding a country willing to accept your immigration. Further-
more, to the degree that a real world market has developed for virtual 
world assets, there is a way to transfer at least some of the time and "work" 
spent in one virtual world to another. While persons moving from one 
country to another will no longer be licensed to teach or practice 
medicine or law, one may sell a Bone Crusher mace if leaving Britannia 
and have real world money to purchase an asset in the virtual world to 
which one is moving. 
This ability to move and dispose of assets also provides market-based 
mechanisms to make virtual worlds conform to the desires of the players. 
A world that is losing players to a world more attentive to the wishes of 
players will see income drop. Those worlds that players find more accept-
able will see the platform owner's income grow. There is also likely to be 
an effect on the real world market value of virtual world assets. As more 
people leave a virtual world, there will be an increase in the market supply 
of assets in that world and a concomitant drop in the prices for those 
assets. As more people move to another virtual world, there will be an 
increase in demand for those assets and a rise in the prices of those assets. 
These economic aspects could also be the mechanism through which 
any demands for democracy find force. In the real world, revolution is a 
dangerous thing for both revolutionary and ruler. Revolutionaries may 
find themselves imprisoned or executed, and rulers may find themselves 
not only deposed, but dead. In virtual worlds, players may find themselves 
suspended or their playing rights terminated, but there seems little that 
may be done to the wizards of the platform owners without the consent of 
the owners themselves. The only leverage against the platform owner is 
economic. A world that is not attractive to players will produce less in-
come to the owner. If democracy is a factor in increasing attraction, that 
will be an incentive toward allowing democratic aspects, even if those in-
centives must be balanced against other interests of the platform owner. 
There is also an interesting reliance among some writers on the 
United States Constitution as a source of rights for avatars or players. As 
the discussion on free speech indicates,249 there is no direct application of 
the Constitution to platform owners because they are not state actors. 
There may still, however, be a role for constitutional values in discussing 
the relations between platform owner and player/avatar. Just as natural 
law concepts may serve as a source of values that courts may adopt as limits 
on the powers of the legislature, the Constitution may serve as a touch-
stone for arguments over the relationship between owner and player/ava-
tar. Neither has real force, until brought within the law of the world at 
249. For a discussion of free speech in virtual worlds, see supra notes 45-78, 
81-125 and accompanying text. 
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issue. Natural law may lead to state or national law, and constitutional 
values may guide the development of rules in virtual worlds.250 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Real world courts should be reluctant to take on disputes arising in or 
out of virtual worlds. Issues of access to virtual worlds are real world issues, 
and courts should certainly entertain First Amendment challenges where 
access is restricted. Issues growing out of the contracts involved, or end 
user license agreements, are also real world issues. The same is true for 
allegations of violations of intellectual property rights or of computer 
hacking laws. For other claims, there should be a real world right or inter-
est at stake and even then there should be some reluctance. In cases 
where there is a financial impact within the real world, the basis for the 
complaint should be something that occurred in the real world, not a vir-
tual act that consequently impacted the real world because of markets that 
have allowed a secondary effect outside the virtual worlds. There may well 
be disagreement with some of the specific conclusions suggested herein, 
and the surety of the conclusions reached may be disputed. It is hoped, 
however, that the caution suggested in real world courts addressing virtual 
world complaints is persuasive, and that the sort of analysis undertaken is 
adopted, whatever specific conclusion is reached on particular issues. 
250. See Berman, supra note 97, at 1289-1305 (analyzing constitutional values 
in virtual worlds). 
